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I 
THE AFGHAN QUESTION. 
S P E E C H E S  
OF THE 
! EARL OF NORTHBROOK 1 
I I N  THE HOUSE O F  LORDS, 
A N D  
M E M O X Z A N D U - M  
ON 
VISCOUNT CRANBKOOK'S DESPATCH 
T O  L O R D  L Y T T O N  
O F  N O V E M B E R  I ~ T H ,  1 8 7 8 .  
i . 
I 
ON VISCOUNT CRANBROOE'S DESPL4TCH. 
When I rend Lord Cran'urook's despatch to Lord Lytton 
.of the 18th of November, I thought that i t  mould give an 
'incxrect impression of the negotiations which took place in 
I873 between the Governlllent of Inciia, when I was Viceroy, 
and the Prime Minister of Shere Ali. I have now had an 
olyortunity of consulting the papers which have been 
published by Her Majesty's Government, and my opinion 
remains the same. 
The acco~znt given in the despatch" seems to me to 
imply that in 1873, 8her.e Mi, influenced by his fear of 
'Russia, aslied for assurances of protection from the Govern- 
ment of Inclia, which I wished to give, but that I was 
prevented by orders from home. 
This is, in fact, the col~struction that has generally been 
" I refer to the following extract fiom Lord Cranbrook's despatch of the 
'18th of November, 1878, Afghanistan Papers, p. 262 :- 
"8 .  . . , . . . The capture of Khiva by the forces of the Czar in the 
spring of 1873, and the total subordination of that Khanate to Russia, caused 
Shere Ali considerable alarm, and led him to question the .i alue of the pledges 
with reference to Afghanistan ~vhich ad been given by His Imperial Xajesty 
to  England, and which had been conl~nunicated to His Highness by the British 
Government. Actuated by his fears on this score, His Highness sent a special 
envoy to Simle in the summer of that year, charged wit11 the duty of expressing 
.them to the Government of India. 
" 9. Finding that the object of the Ameer was to ascertain definitely horn 
far  he might rely on the hell) of the British Governnlent if his territories Irere 
threatened by Russia, Lord Nortl~brook's Government vas  prepared [telegram 
from Viceroy, 24th July, 18731 to assure him that, under cestain conditions, the  
\Government of India would assist hi111 to repel unprovoked aggression. But 
Her Majesty's Government a t  home did not share [telegram to  Viceroy, 26th 
July, 18731 His Highness's apprehension, and the Viceroy ultimately informed 
the Ameer that the discussion of the question xx.ould be best postponed to a more 
convenient season." [Letter from Viceroy, 6th September, 1873, in Secret 
(Letter, No. 76, dated 13th September, 1873.1 
put upon the words used by Lord Cranbrook ; and, as I am 
perfectly acvainted with the facts of the case, I think it i s  
right, in  conlmon justice to the Government under which 
I then servecl, to esplain as clearly as I can what really 
ocwrred. 
I n  the beginning of the year 1873 it became necessary to  
obtain the consent of Shere Ali t o  an arbitration which the 
British Government had undertaken betmeon Yersia and 
Afghanistan, -with respect t o  the frontier of tliose cortntries in 
the prorince of Seistan. I also n~ishecl to inform him of the 
particulars of the recognition g i ~ e n  by Russia to the Afghan 
frontier. I suggested, therefore, that he should receive at 
CabuI a British officer who n~ould be able to esl~lnin these 
matters t o  him. His reply was that if I wishecl it he wotdcl 
receire a British cffiter, but that it wo~dd in his opinion be 
more conrenient if, in the first place at any rate, his Prime 
Ninister should vait upon me at Simla, in order to hear whak 
I wished to communicate to hiin. I acceded at  once to his> 
suggestion, and his Prime Minister, Noor Mnl~omecl Shah, 
came to Sirnla in the summer of 1873. Shere Ali had, about 
the same time, stated to the British Agent nt Cabul that hhe. 
was m c h  alarmed at the advance of Hussia i n  the direction 
of hlerve, and that he was anxious for more positive assurances. 
of protection from the Gore;.nment of India against Russia 
than he  had hitherto received. He therefore authorisecl his 
Frime U i n i i  to take the opportuuity of communicating to 
me his views upon that subject. 
After an  interview with the: Prime Minister on the 12th 
of July, I sent a telegram on the 24th t o  the Duke of Argyll, 
wlio was then Secretary of State for Inclia, in the following 
words :- 
" Ameer of Cabul a1:nned at Russian progress ; dissatisfied with 
general assurances &ild anxious to know definitely how far he may rely 
on our help if invaded. I propose to assure hiin if he unreservedly 
accepts and acts on our advice in all esternal relations we will help hin~ 
with money, :mls, ancl troops, if necessary, to repel unprovoked 
invasion. M'e to be the judge of the necessity. " 
The Duke of Argyll answered on the 26th that 
The Cabinet think you should infor111 Ameer that me clo not at a11 
share 1li.s J:ir~u,'and conside 
him we sh;dl inailitl~ilr 011r s 
abides by our advice in este 
1 have given the. 
Granbrook appears to 
received VOS a refusa 
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postponed. This is 
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the f olloming terms, T V ~  
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Goveln~llent, to restrict o 
independent ruler, to ta 
any aggression on his ten 
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llecessity aid him with 
perfectly free to decide n 
renclered, ancl also as tu i 
x~,-,.;ill be coaclitiornl up011 
alld on his u~nreserved a 
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But Shere Ali 
P r ime  Xinister eslil: 
gnaruntee of protect: 
would be supplied -i 
*hare his alarm,'znd consider there ir, no cause for it, but you lnoy assure 
hiin we sh;ill iilaintain our sec.ttledpolicy in  favour of Afql~anietan, if he  
abides by our advice in exterl~al z3l~irs."" 
1 have given these telegrams in full, because Lord 
.6ranbrooli appears to have snpposed tliat t l ~ e  answer I 
received was a refusal to sanction my proposal, that the 
.assurances I wished to give were not given, and that the 
Ameer was siniply told that the discussion of the subject w a s  
postponed. This is not the fact. On the contrary, I 
fconsidered that the answer I received authorisecl me to give to 
the Prime Minister the assunances which I wislled to give. 
1 actually gave him those asswances on the 30th of July, in 
-the follosving terms, mhicli aye al~uost identical with the molds 
~f my telegram to the Duke 01 Argyll of the 24th : - 
" The British Governlnent did not share the Ameer's apprehensions 
((of attack by R ~ ~ s s i a )  ; but, as alreaciy meiltionecl 111 the previous 
col~versation, it would bc the duty of the Ameer, In case of any actual 
or threatened aggression, to refer tlie q~lestion to the British. Goveru- 
ment, who would endeavour by negotiation, and by every means in 
their power, to  settle the matter and avert hostilities. I t  wt~s not 
intenclecl, by insisting on such previons reference to the British 
Governmeilt, to  restrict or interfere wit11 the pomer of the Ameer, as an 
independent ruler, to  take such steps as miglit be necessary to repel 
a n y  aggression on his territories ; but sucll reference was il preliminaqf 
a n d  essential condition of the British Government assisting liiln. I n  
+iuch event, should these endeavours of the British GOT-ernnlent o 
bring about an amicable settlenlent prove fruitless, the British 
Government are prepared to assure the Anleer that they will afford 
assistance in the shape of arms and Inoney, ancl will also in case of 
necessity aid hiin with troops. The Britisli Government holds itself 
perfectly free to decide as to the occasioll whell such assistance sl~ould be 
rendered, and also as to its n a h r e  and extent ; moreover, the assistance 
will be conditional upon the Ameer himself abstaining from aggression, 
and  on his unreserved acceptance of the aclvice of the British Govern- 
lnent i n  regnrd t o  his external relations. "? 
Bnt Shere A!i wanted much more than this. The 
Prime Minister explained that he wished fop an unconditionrtl 
guarantee of protection, and to receive an assurance that ,the 
would be s~~pplied with whatever money, arms, or troops he 
- 
" -4fghsnixtsn P~~pe;.d, p. 10;. t Afgl~nnistan Papers, p. 114. 
might ask for from the British Government in the event of: 
attick. He also tvishecl for large grants of money and arms 
to pnt his fortresses in order, and to equip his army. For all 
this no return whatever was to be askecl by the British 
Government from Afghanistan. 
" 
Such requests were, of course, quite unreasonable, and I 
could not entertain them. 
I addressed a letter to the Anleer on the 6th of Eeptembel; 
a t  the close of the negotiations, and after giving some 
explanations of the corresponclence with Russia about the 
Afghan boundary, I continued as follows :- 
(' The result of the con~mu~~ications betveen the British and the 
Russian Governments has been, in 1ny opinion, materially to strengthen 
the position of Afghanistan and to remove apprehension of dangers 
from ~ i t h o u t .  . . . To this settlenlent the British Government are 
a party, ancl they are consequently even Inore interested than before in 
%he maintenance of the integrity of your Highness's frontier. I have 
had some conversation with your Envoy on the subject of the policy 
which the British Governnlent would pursue in the event of an attack 
upon your Highness's territories. A copy of the record of these 
conversations is attached to this letter. But the question is, in my 
opinion, one of such importance that the discussion of it should be 
postponed to a Inore suitable opportunity. 
- - 
"I do not entertain any apprehensions of danger to your Higllness's 
territories from without, and I therefore clo not consider that it  is 
necessary that your Highness should at present incur any large 
expenditure vitll a view to such a contingency. My hope is that, 
Imving received the foregoing assurances, your Higllness will now be 
enabled to devote your undisturbed attention to the consolidation and 
improvement of your internal Government. The British Governnlent 
desires to  see your Rigl~ness's country powerful and independent. It 
is my determination to nlaintain the policy which has been adoptecl 
towards your Highness by my predecessors, Lord Lawrence and Lord 
Mayo, and I repeat to  your Highness the assurance given you at the 
Umballa Durbar, that the British Government will endeavol.lr, from 
time to time, by such meand as circunlstallces may require, to 
strengthen the Government of your Higluless, to enable yon to exercise 
piit11 equity and with justice your rightful rule, and to transmit to 
your descendants all the dignities and honours of which you are the 
lawful possessor. "* 
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letter t o  the Ameer, and which contained the assurances of 
whkh I ]lave quoted, were formal documents, which 
h a d  b e e n  translated and officially comm~micatecl a t  the time 
to the Ameer's Prime Ministel; and by mhich the British 
~ ~ y e r n m e n t  were, in my opinion, bound. 
I had  received no instructions from Her Majesty's 
Government  to postpone the discussion of the question, and 
m y  reasons for writing in that sense to the Ameer were 
explained in the following extract from the despatch from the 
Goyernrnent  of India t o  the Secretary of State, of the 15th 
of September, 1873 :- 
r c  A copy and translation of these conversations" (containing the: 
a s s u r a n c e s  of protection) "u~ere annexed to tlie letter vhich the Viceroy 
has addressed to the Ameer. But as the hLject is one of great 
importance, and the Envoy appeared to doubt how far his instructions 
j u s t i f i e d  him in committing himself to any definite arrangement, we 
c o l ~ s i d e r e d  it  advisable to postpone the settlenlent of it to a more 
f a v o u r a b l e  opportunity, when we trust the matter ]nay be cliscussed 
with t h e  Ameer-in person. "5 
T h e  result of the comm~~nications which passed in 1873 
b e t w e e n  Shere Ali's Prime Minister and myself was that an 
a s su rance  of protection was given to Shere Ali, subject to 
condi t ions  which I thought then, and stili think, to be 
reasonable  and necessary ; but that, as Lord Mayo had done 
in 1869, I declined to comply with his wish for an uncon- 
ditional gumantee of protection. 
T h e  neg.otiations of 1873 were approved by the Duke of 
hgyll ,  to whom they were reported in Septelllber of that 
year, and I have never had any reason to suppose that they 
were disapproved by Mr. Disraeli's Government, which 
succeeded to office a few months afterwards. In a debate 
upon the question, xr13ich was raised in the House of Lords 
by L o r d  Napier and Ettrick, in June, 1574, Lord Derby, 
representing the Government, expressed his opinion strongly 
a g a i n s t  granting an unconditional guarantee of protection to 
Shere Ali. During the two succeeding years, when I was 
V i c e r o y  under the Administration of Mr. Disraeli, no 
sugges t ion  was made by the Secretary of State to the 
" Afghanistan Papers, p. 109. 
Government of India that the unconditionsll guarantee for 
which Xhere Al i  asked in 1873 ought to be given to him. 
On the contrary, in January, 1875," Lord SaEsbury, who 
was then Secretary of State for India, urged the Government 
of India to press Shere Ali to agree to the establishment of a 
British agency at  Herat, a demand which his P i h e  Minister 
had told the Foreign Secretmy in 1873 would giv-e rise to 
mistrust and misapprehension.f I n  reply we expressed our 
opinion, after consulting all the officers of the Government of 
India, both European and Native, whom we believed to be 
able to form a correct judgment of the sentiments of the 
Ameer, tlmt he wodd  be found most unwilling to receive a 
British Agent a t  Herat, but that we did not think that his 
objection would imply that his intentions had ceased to be 
ioyal towards the British Government ; and we pointed out 
that Lord Mayo had distinctly intimated to the Ameer in 
1869, that no European officers wodd be placed as Residents 
in his cities, $ W e  snrnmed up our opinion in the following 
words :- 
" It is in  our opinion essential that the proposed arrangements should 
have the cordial consent of tlie Ameer. For the reasons given above, 
we are of opinion that, if we were to press the question on the Ameer 
at  pr,esent, our proposals would in  all probability either be refused or 
accepted with great relucta~ice. 
" If the Anleer should give an unwilling consent, the officers whom 
we have consulted are agreed that no advantage would be derived from 
the presence of a British -4gent a t  Herat . . . . . . 
" If the Anleer should refuse, his refusal would impair tlie influence 
of the Government of India i n  Afghanistan. It must either be  
accepted without any change being ln?de in our present policy towards 
Afghanistan, in which case the Alneer would be encouraged to act up011 
other occasions without regard to the wishes of the British Government ; 
or we must treat it as a proof of unfriendly feeling on his part, modify 
our present policy, retire from our attitude of sympathy, and withdraw 
our assurances of support. If we are correct in believing that the  
refusal would not shew the intentions of the Anleer to be disloyal, it 
n-ould afford no sufEcient justification for a cl~ange of policy which 
might throw Afghanistali into the arms of Russia upon the first 
favourable opportunity. " $I 
" Afghanistan Papers, p. 128. 1. Afghanistan Papers, y. 163. 
Afghanistan Papers, p. 94. Afghanistan Papers, p. 135. 
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Notwithstanding this expression of opinion on the psrt of 
the Government of India, Lord SaIisLury, in Xovember, 
1875: instructed us to enter into negotiations with Shere 
Ali for the establishment of a British agency in  Afghanistan. 
Neither then nor in the previous despatcli had Lorcl Salisbury 
authorised us to offer to Shere Ali any more unqualified 
guarantee of protection than was given to him in 187'3, or, 
iadeed, any new concession whatever. We wcre, therefore, 
obliged to ask for further instructions from B e r  Ncijesty's 
Government. W e  thought that Shere Ali mould celtninly, 
if he entertained the proposal at all, raise the q~~estion of an 
unconditional guarantee of protection, and we said to Lord 
Salisbury in our despatch of the 28th of January, 1876 :--1- 
" Your Lordship will doubtless have read the observations made by 
the Anleer in May, 1873, and the conli~lunicatiolls xvhich took place 
with Syud Noor Mshomed later in  the same year on the subject of the  
protection of Afghanistan. It then appeared that notl~ing short of a 
full and z~ncondltional promise of protection against foreign attack 
would have been satisfactory to the Ameer ; consequently in t h e  
Viceroy's letter to His Highness of the 6th of September, 16'73, t h e  
questioil x.as deliberately reserved for future consideration. We ha& 
no authority then, nor have we received authority since, from H e r  
Majesty's Governnlent to give to the Anleer any such uzlcolldiiional 
guaraxtee, and we are of opinion that there are grave objections 
against b~nding the British Government by any such obligation. We 
are precluded by l a a  from entering illto a treaty of this nature without 
the express conlmand of Her Majesty's Government, and unless such a 
treaty is accompanied by reciprocal engagelnents on the part of the 
Ameer, which seems to us to be inapplicable to the present conclition of 
affairs. " 
W e  also felt it to be our duty to endeavour to induce 
H e r  Najesty's Governnlent to reconsider the conclusions a t  
which they had arrived; and me ended our despatch in the 
following words :- 
"We h e a d y  see the fruits of the conciliatory policy which has 
been pursued since 1869, in the consolidation of the Anleer's power and  
t h e  establishment of a strong government on our frontier. The Ameer's 
not unnatural dread of our interference in I t s  internnl affairs and the  
difficulties of his position, as described in our despatch of the 7th of 
June last, combined, perhaps, x i th  tile conviction that if ever a struggle 
* Afghanistan Papers, p. 147. t Afghanistan Papers, p. 149. 
j 33 GeorgeIIII., c. 52. 
10 
for tlie independence of Afghanistan should come, me nlust in our own 
interest help him, nlay have induced hini to assume a colder attitude 
torvards us thail we shoulcl desire. But  me have no reason to believe 
that he has any desire to prefer the frienclship of other Powers. W e  
are convi~~ced that a patient adherence to the policy adopted towards 
Afgl~anistan by Lord Canning, Lord Lawrence, and Lord Mayo, whicll 
i t  has been our earnest endeavour to maint;rill, presents the greatest 
prolnise of the eventual establishinent of our relations wit11 the Ameer 
on a satisfactory footing ; a l c l  we deprecate, as involving serious. 
danger to the peace of Afghanistan and to the interests of the British 
Enlpire in  India, the execution, under present circunlstances, of the 9 
instructions conseyecl in  your Lordshi l~ '~ despatch." 
I have alluded t,o this correspondence, not only to show 
that down to April, 1876, when I ceased to be Viceroy, the 
Government of India hacZ receivecl no indication that H e r  
Majesty's Government were of opinion that the assurances 
of protection given to Shere Ali in 1873 were i n s a -  
cient ; but because the reference to this correspondence 
in Lord Cranbrook's despatch" altogether fails adequately 
+Paragraph 11, Afghanistan Papers, p. 263 :- 
'' I n  view of these interests, and of the responsibilities which had 
B 
nlorally devolved upon the British Government on behalf of 
Afghanistan, looking also t o  the imperfect information available in 
regarcl to the country, in respect to wlGch those responsibilities had 
been incurrecl, Lord Northbrook's Government had, in 1873, expressed 
the opinion that the temporary presence in Afgl~anistan of a 
British officer, as then proposecl by them, might do nluch to allay any 
feelings of mistrust lingering i n  the minds of the Afghan people, and 
might at the same time prepare the way for eventually placing 
permanent British representatives a t  C a b ~ ~ l ,  Herat, and elsewhere, 
Encouraged by this opinion, Her  Majesty's Governnlent came to the 
conclusion that, although Lord Nortl~broolr's efforts to attain the 
desired object had not met wit11 success, the time had come when the 
't 
measure thus indicated could no longer with safety be postponed, 
Your predecessor in  Council had, indeed, whilst appreciating all the 
advantages to be anticipatecl from it, frankly represented to H e r  
Majesty's present advisers the clificulties attending the initiation of 
i t  ; he believed the time and circunlstances of the Inonlent to  be  
inopportune for placing British Agents on the Afgllan borders, and 
wax of opinion that such a step should be deferred till the progress. 
of events justified niore specific assurances to Shere -41i, which might 
then be given in the shape of a treaty, followed by the establishinent 
of agencies at Herat and other suitable places. Her  Majesty's 
Government, however, were unable to agree in this view." 
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t o  express the serious representations wllic11, upon two 
~ccasions, we felt it to be OLE duty to address to 
H e r  Majesty's Government as t o  the results which, in 
our opinion, woulcl follow from an endeavour to press 
Shere Ali to receive British Residents in Afghanistan. 
I n  the proceeclings of the Government of India when 
I was Viceroy to which I 1Ia-i-e referred, there was a n  
unanimous concumence of opinion on the part of the 
Nembers of my Council. 
I n r d  Cranbrook states in his despatch" that Lord Lytton 
was instructed in 1876, " to offer to Shere Ali that same 
active countenance and protection wllich he had previously 
solicited at the hands of the Indian Government." Buut 
he  adds that "it was clearly impossible to enter into any 
formal engagement in this sense without requiring from the 
b e e r  some substantial proof of his unity of interests with 
the British Government." The offensive and defensive 
treaty, therefore, which Lord Lytton mas instructed to offer 
did not contain, the unconditional guarantee of p~otection 
for which Shere Ali asked in 1573 from the Gorernment 
of India. " I t  was clearly impossible," to use Lord 
Cranbrook's words, to give him such a guarantee. 
It appears from the papers which have now been 
published that the sine p i4  noiz of the treaty which was 
offered Shere Ali by Lord Lytton, under the instructions 
conveyed in Lord Salisbury's despatch of the 28th of 
February, 1876, was that Shere Ali should agree to the 
permanent location of British officers in Bfghanistan; and 
$he heads of a treaty which the British Native Agent at 
Cabul was instructed to esplain to Shere Ali in  October,. 
l876,-F limited the gunrantee of protection which was 
offered to him very much as I had limited it in 1873, 
besides imposing upon him other conditions. 
I think I have shewn that the inferences which have 
been generally d r a m  from Lord Cranlsrook's despatch,- 
* Paragraph 12, Afghanistan Papers, p. 963. 
Afghanistan ?apers, p. 184. Consult also Draft of Treaty t o  be negotiated 
by Sir Lewis Pelly, and  side Mdmoire for Subsidiary Secret and Explanatory. 
Agreement," pp. 189-1'31. 
namely, that d e n  I mas Viceroy in 1873, I wisiied to  
.conlply with Shere Ali's request for assurances of protection, 
but I mas over-ruled by the Honle Government, and that 
-there was a change of policy with rezarcl t'o complying with SPEECH 03' 
the request he made in 1873, after Mr. Disraeli succeeded 
Mr. Gladstone aa Prime Minister, are not in nccordnnce with Ao tA5  
the facts of the case. 
I have confined myself esclusively in  this mernornndum 
to the correction of seine 01, the incorrect inferences ~vhich 
have been generally clra~vn from Lord Cra~lbrooli's clespatch 
.of the 18th of November. !I disapprove of the proceedings 
of Her  Majesty's Government which have res~~l tcd  in war 
between Great Britain and Afghanistan; but I shall reserve 
the expression of my reasons for arriving a t  tll:zt co~lclusion 
until the meeting of Padinment. :I haye tllouglit it nligllt 
not be xvithout advantage, however, to  tile discussions which account of my a in dealing -wit1 will then take place, that I should put upon reeorcl my 
-testimony upon matters of fact ns to which no orlo can Be so Ind in .  It al3p 
well able to speak as I am. t h e  noble Visco. 
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The Eanr, OF NORTHUBOOK : My Lords, I rise to adclress 
your Lordships on this occasion because i t  appears to me 
that  I am called '1113on to give eticlence on two points, on 
both of which I am obliged to give it against H e r  Majesty's 
Government. The noble Visconnt opposite (Visconnt Cran- 
brook), in answering the speech of my noble friend behind me, 
(Earl Granville) gave, as far as I coulcl follow him, a very able 
aeco~mt of my actions and of the motives .chat actuated me 
i n  dealing with the Arneer of Cabul wllen I was Viceroy of 
India. I t  appears to me, however, with all clne deference to 
the noble Triscount, that I am the only person who can state to 
your Lordships ant1 to the country esnctly what I did when 
I mas Governor-Genoral of India. 
The question at issue between IIS is a very simple one. I 
have never made any charge against the noble Viscount of' 
having endesvourecl wilfully to misrepresent my condnct in 
this matter ; but I am bound to say that the worcls used by 
the noble Viscount in his desl3atch of the 18th of November* 
last give the people of this country an entirely inaccurate 
impression of what really happenecl at the time. That 
inaccurate impression has not only been espressed in  the. 
daily organs of the Press, but it bas also been expressed 
to-night by the noble Lorcl the seconder of the Address. In 
Paragraplls 8 and 9 of the m b l e  Viscount's despatch, he- 
says that- 
' L  Shere Ali, actuated by his fears on this score, sent a special 
Envoy to Sinlla in the sulnmer of that year (1873) charged with the 
duty of expressing the111 to the Gorenmle~it of India,." 
And in  Paragraph 9, he says- 
'' Finding that the object of the h n e e r  was to ascertain definitely 
how far he nlight rely on the help of the British Government if his 
territories were threatened by Russia, Lord Northbrook's Government 
was prepared to assure him that under certain conditions t h e  Gorrer~i- 
14 
ment of India would assist l l i~n  to repel unprovoked aggression. But 
Her  Majesty's Goverlll~lellt a t  home did not share His Hjglmess's 
apprehensions, and the Viceroy ultimately informeci the Ameer that 
the discussion of the question would be best postponed to a more 
convenient season. " 
KO person who reads those paragraphs could come to any 
other conclusion than that I wished to give certain assurances 
-to the Ameer which I mas prevented from giving by the 
Home Government, and that I was therefore compelled to 
tell the Ameer that the discussion of the matter had better 
be postponed to a future time ; and from another 
.of the noble Viscount's despatch i t  has been natu~ally in- 
ferred that Her Majesty's present Government gave in  1876 
assurances to the Arneer which Her Majesty's late Govern- 
ment in 18'73 had refused to give him. 
As regards the first part of the question, I am, as I said 
before, the only person who can give evidence with respect 
to it. The fact is, that having asked to be allowed to give to 
t h e  Ameer certain assurances, and having received a reply by 
telegraph from the Home Government in answer to my 
inquiry, I felt that their tele~a~-i~stifie&-~e,~in giving the ! Ameer the precise assurances I desired to give him, and 
; which I actually did give him through his Prime Minister, 
! an authenticated copy of those assurances being forwarded 
( t o  kin1 personally. So far, therefore, from the despatch of 
"he noble Viscount giving an accurate impression of what E 
; occurred, it gives an impression totally at variance with the 
4 
- facts of the case. As the noble Viscount has gone into this i. 
: question at such length, and as the Duke of Argyll is unable 
3 to be in his place to-night to explain his own conduct, I asked 
! him to allow me to make use of any private letters relating 
! to this subject which might have passed between us;  and, I with his permission, I will read to the House a paragraph \ 
? from a private letter I wrote to him two clays after I received 
his telegram permitting me to give the assurance I desired to 
give to the Ameer, and before I had the interview with his 
Prime Minister. The words I used in the letter I wrote to 
the Duke of Argyll were these-" Y2pr telegram"_of&ezh 
will enable me to give him sufficiently distinct assurances.' 
I">* -^Y&*- " *-.- 
TLis letter, therefore, entirely bears out my impression of 
what occurred at that time. 
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While I entirely acquit the noble Viscount of any 
deliberate intention to misrepreserlt the matter, I cannot 
help thinking that it is extremely unfortunate that he did not 
.take mole pains to master the facts of the case. If he had 
taken common pains to do so, he would never h a ~ e  allowed the 
paragraphs in his despatch to vhich I have referred to stand- 
r" 
-ishe noble Viscount would have found my view of the case 
Supported by the despatch of the noble Marquis opposite 
(the Marquis of Salisbury), of the 38th of February, 1876, 
who, in page 1-58 of the Papers, in referring to this question, 
says :- 
L C  Ill the year 1873, Lord Nortllbrook ga1-e t o  the Envoy of tlle 
Anleer the personal assurance that in the event of any aggression upon 
%he territories of His Highness, ~vl~icli the British Gorernnlent had 
failed to avert by negotiation, illat Governllle~lt would be prepared 
" t o  assure tlre Ameer that they will afford him assistance in the shape of 
arlns and  money, and will also, in cases of necessity, assist lutn with 
troops .' '' 
VISCOUNT CI~ANBROOIC:: GO on. Read the next paragraph. 
The EARL OF NORTHBROOK : I will do so if the noble 
-Viscount wishes me to do so. The despatch goes on :- 
L L  The terms of this declaration, however, dtl~ougll sufficient to  
justify reproaclles on the part of Shere Ali, if in the contingency to 
which it referred he should be left mlsupported 1 q  the British 
Government, were, unfortunately, too anbiguous to secure confidence 
or  to inspire gratitude on the part of His Highness. The Snleer, in 
fact, appears to have remained under a, resentful i~npressio~l t mt his 
Envoy had been trified with, and his attitude towards the Gover~unent 
of India has ever since been characterisecl by allbignity and reserve." 
That  is an argument to which I will advert immediately. 
A t  present I am dealing merely wit11 the facts of the case, 
and I think that if the nobleViscount had consulted the Papers 
,carefully he never would have introduced these paragraphs 
into his despatch. If any one vill read the 12th paragraph 
.of Lord Lytton's despatch of the 10th of May, 1877, at  page 
162 of the Papers, it will be seen that the account of the 
noble Viscount does not state the case accurately. There 
is  also the statelvent in  the conferences between the Prime 
Minister of the Ameer and Sir Lewis Pelly, which gives a, 
completely accurate account of the transactions of 1873. 
The Prime Minister says that the assurances at his first 
I G  
interview were not sufficient, but that afterwards further 
assurances mere given ; and if the noble Viscount desires 
any further evidence, there is the language of Lord Lytton 
in his letter of the 16th of March, 1577, to the Prime 
Ninister, in which the assurances I had given in 1573 were 
withdrawn ; all notice of which has been omitted by the 
noble Triscount. Therefore, I say that even from the Papers 
themselves the noble Viscount ought to have formed a more 
accurate judgment of the transaction, ancl have avoided 
mriting a paragraph ~vhich has Iecl to such misapprehension 
on the part of the public. 
But that is not all. The noble Viscount has now upon his 
Council three distinguished Indian statesmen who were Mem- 
bers of my Council in 1873, or afterwards-Sir Henry Norman, 
Sir Barrow Ellis, and Sir William Muir-all of whom were 
cognizant of these transactions ; n11d yet wi11 it be believed 
that the noble Viscount has not taken the common precaution 
of asking thein whether he n7as right in  his facts before 
publishing those parstgraphs, and that the first thing that 
they knew about his despatch was seeing it in the news- 
papers P If he had taken that precaution, the nobleViscount 
would not have found himself in the diffic~dt position in 
which he is now placed. 
Esception has been taken by the noble Earl behincl me 
(Earl Granville) to the lGth paragraph of the despatch 
of the noble Viscount of the 18th of November, which 
refers to the close of Sir Lewis Pelly's negotiations, and 
I cannot 1001: upon the explanation of the noble Viscount 
with respect to the accuracy of that paragraph as satisfactory. 
I n  the 1Sth pamgraph, moreover, the noble Viscount describes 
the position of the Governnlent after the close of the nego- 
tiations as one of " vigilant reserve." The real position was 
that on the 15th of March, 1877, the Viceroy had informed 
the Ameel thnt ail the assmances of protection he had received 
from Lord Lawrence, Lord Nayo, and myself, were repudiated, 
and that the only engagement by which the British Govern- 
ment were bound was the Treaty of 1855, under which no 
assurance of protection was give11 him. I clo not think any- 
one would dram any such inference as this from the account 
given in the despatch of these transactions. Giving the noble 
4iscolxnt .  every cred 
of the case in 
h is  conclusion 
be very much s 
T h e r e  is anothe~ 
,qhich I must allude 
Eersozlnl  knowledge 
leaves it to be infer 
~ e n t  have given to 
+he ssslu.ances wlli 
gl-Lioh I was not 31 
in condemnator 
attttt~ched to the asst 
V r s c o v r ; ~  CR.G 
the sentiment whi( 
T h e  EARL 01
Viscount would nc 
s t r ~ ~ c t i o n .  His  m 
seemed to inlply 
wfiicll ought to h 
to p o i n t  out to y( 
A m e e r  bg H e r  M 
far more st~ict l  
c o n t a i n  the 
a ~ ~ t h o r i s e d  to co 
to t h e  Ameer in 
r r r ~ d e r  certain circ 
t l r e  shape of arm: 
assist him with t] 
slloxlld abstain 
a c c e p t  the advice 
e x t e r n a l  relation! 
Sir Levis Felly 
T V ' ~ L ~ C ~  is given a' 
T h e r e  is nn nssu 
Ar t i c l e ,  but i t  
in. the 
1 g i v e n  to  the Ax Highness  sh011l $ s ign  on, or in' 
A 
I 17 4 
that af terwards further I Viscount every credit for a desire not to misrepresent the 
e noble Viscount  de&res , facts of the case in his desp:~tch, I must say that anyono who 
lnguage of Lord Lytton reads his conclusions, and then carefully examines the  Papers 
rch, 1877, to the Prime * will be very much surprised. 
11ad given i n  1573 were , There is another point in the noble Iriscount's speech to  
as been omit ted by the which I rn~lst allude, although it is orie on which I have no 
 at even from the Papers personal knowledge. The noble Viscount in  his despatch 
to have fo rmed  a more leaves it to be inferred tliat Her Majesty's present Govern- 
ion, and h a v e  avoided ment have given to tlie Ameer, or rather offered to the Ameer, 
0 such misapprehension the assurances vhich n i s  Eighness required from me, and 
which I aas  not able to give him. The noble V i s c o ~ ~ n t  spoke 
scount has n o w  u p o n  his in a condemnatory sense of the safeguards and  cautions 
itesmen who were Mem- attached to the assurances offered to Shere Ali in  1873. 
ds-Sir H e n r y  Norman, V ~ s c ; o c x ~  C~i~ll11001i  : I must deny having expressed 
uir-all of w h o m  were the sentiment which the noble Earl imputes to me. 
yet will it be believecl The EARL OF N O ~ ~ U L H I ~ O O K  : Then I wish the  noble 
the common precaution Viscotznt would not use lang~lage which is liable to miscon- 
't in his facts  before struction. EIis words abo~zt "vague" assurances certainly 
l t  the first thing that seemed to imply t h t  tliose assurances were not of a kind 
eeing i t  in the news- which ought to lmve been given at the time. Now, I wish 
on, the noble Viscount to point out to your Lordships that the oifers made to the 
3 affi~~lt posi t ion  in Ameer by Her  Majesty's preseut Government were guarded 
far more strictly than those of 1873. These papers 
able Ear l  b e h i n d  me contain the draft treaty which Sir Lewis PelIy was 
V h  of the despatch authol.lsed to conclude with the Arneer. My assurances 
)f November; which to the Ameer in 187:) were that the British Government, 
Y'S negotiations, and under certain circumstances, would afford him assistance in 
)f the noble Viscount  tlle shape of arms and ~noney, and also, in case of necessity, 
Pap11 as satisfactory. assist him with tro01)s. The safeguards were these-that he 
3le Viscount describes sllould abstain fro111 aggression and should unreservedly 
e close of tlze =ego- accept tlle advice of the British Ciovern~nent in regarcl to  his 
real position was external relations. Nov, turuing to the draft treaty which 
riceroy had iof o rmod  Sir Lewis Pelly was suthorised to conclude with the  Ameer, 
ction he had received \v:~ich is given at page 190 of the Papers, what cclo 1 find ? 
were repudiated, There is an assurance of protection, no cloubt, in  the second 
the British Go.vern- I Article, but i t  is qualified in the tllird and fo~rr th  Articles 
i 55, under which  n o  in precisely the same uTaj- as the assurance of protection 
[ do not think any- I given to the Ameer in 1873. The qualification is that  His  from the acooun t  Highness should " refmill from all provocation of, aggres- 
Giving the l lobls  1 on, or interference with, the States and territories 
P 
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beyond his present frontier," and that "he  sh011ld 
conduct his relations with foreign St:~tes in harmony with 
the policy of the British Government." It appenrs that the 
Viceroy was not quite satisfied with these conditions, and on 
looking to the "cci(le ~lie'tl~oirc for subsidiary secret :and 
explanatory agreement," at page 101, yon will fintl that it 
was understood, in regard to Article 2,  that the hmeer 
should " bind himself to abstain froill cliscussio11 of political, 
international, or State matters with any foreign Govern- 
ment," communicating unreservedly to the Ihitidi Govern- 
ment a11 communications on sucli sul!jerts receivc>il by Iiim. 
I wish to show that if there is nny distinctioll Letwee11 the 
terms offered to the Smeer by the Viceroy uuclcr ilistructioris 
from the Home Governme~it, and the  term^ \vliich were 
proposed in 1573, the terms prolmsecl by Her Mqjesty's 
present Government mere more strict than tllose of 1873. 
I have thought it right to mention this, becnuse there is 
great misapprehension on the subject.? It  llas been said in 
several of the nevspapers, ant1 notably by tllo 2'/iN J ~ I N  
Gcczette, that the conduct of tho late Government to~vartls 
Shere Ali was t>lle whole cause of the present W ~ L ~ .  Shere 
Ali, said the Pn71 f i l l  Gnzetfc, wanted to throw himself 
into the arms of England, and made n 111~oposnl wllic6 Lord 
Northbrooli mas willing to accept, but ~vliicll Ur. Gladstone's 
Government declined ; and out of that prol~osnl has grown 
the Afghan war. /Ilnowing the truth of this matter, as I do, 
I cannot, in common fairncss and justice to tlit? Got-er11ment 
under vhich I was then serving, refrain from ex1)lnining 
what the real facts of the case are, a,nd I vent~~re  to say 
I slzould have taken the same coulrse if tl~ixso cir~un~stances 
&ad occurred when the party opposite was in office, m d  ~vhile 
I was serving under the Earl of 13enconsficld. 
I think the noble Marcyuis (tho Mnrcluis of Salisbury) 
has very much underrated the impnrtnuce of t l l ~  observatic~ns 
of the noble Earl beside me (14l:~rl Grnnr.i1ll*) npon tho 
debate which occ~med in this IIo~lsc 0x1 thc 12th of Jurla last 
year. I db not think nriytlling which t~mo~uzts to co~icc.i~li~l~ 
frzm your Lordships facts whidl am known by Ministc,~ 
can be considered to be a " small 1)erzonal cjncd ion un~rvohhy 
of discussion." It su happened t l d  I touk r b  very groat 
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interest in the debate in question, and the account Tvhich the 
noble Marquis has given of it is not one which I feel dis- 
posed to accept. My noble friend (the Duke of Argyll) 
certainly did put some questions on particular points to the 
noble Marquis, but he did not confine his speech to that. 
If he had done so, I might have accepted the explanation 
now given by the noble Marquis. My noble friend dis- 
cussed the policy pursued by successive Viceroys towards 
Afghanistan, remarking that the views of the last three 
TTiceroys were that we should maintain an amicable and 
watchful attitude towards the Ameer, without entangling 
ourselves in permanent engagements. There can be only one 
interpretation of what occurrecl. The Duke of Argyll wished 
to receive, not only an answer to a particular question, but a 
general assurance from the noble Marquis that he had not 
departed from the line of policy indicated. I remember 
hearing the noble Marquis state that affairs maintained a 
peaceful aspect, and that there was '(no reason for any 
apprehension of any change of policy or disturbance in our 
Ifidian Empire." But the noble Marquis, in now quoting 
*hat passage, omitted to quote the words "in our Indian 
Empire." 
I assert on my own authority, having been personally in 
the House and having listened with the greatest care to what 
fell from the noble Marquis, that I believed and accepted 
those words to mean that there had been no material change 
i n  our relations with Afghanistan. That is not all, because 
I adchessed your Lordships, and I gate the noble Marquis an 
opportunity, of which he might have taken advantage, of 
explaining the misconception under vhich I Iabourecl, and of 
stating to your Lordships precisely the state of affairs as they 
esisted at that time. As the matter is important, I must 
trouble your Lordships with the few ~vords 1 used on that 
accasion. I said :- 
'' The policy we have pursued v i th  regard to the Anleer has been to 
show hiin that we desired to assist hiin with OUT advice whenever he 
required it, and not to press upon him the presence of British oEcers 
i n  his territories, unless he really desires that tliey sliould go there, 
and  will give them a welcome." 
I said :- 
" That if that policy is deliberately adhered to now, as it has  bee^ 
for many years, whatever suspicions may be entertained by the Allleer 
will disappear ; he d l  see that they have no foundation ; he will look 
upon us as his best friends, to  whom in certain circumstarices he 
have to apply for assistance." 
I added :- 
" It is with great satisfaction I hear that the policy I have referre&. 
t o  H e r  Majesty's Governnlent will continue to  pursue."-[3 Hat~sctrd, 
CCXX~~I - .  1843.1 
I therefore stated in the presence of your Lordships the inter- 
pretation I put on the words of the noble Marquis; and I 
further said :- 
" I an1 satisfied he has given us that assurance in perfect good faith, 
and  that we may trust hi111 not to resist any attenlpt to put it aside." 
I f  it had not been for that assurance, as I ~~nderstood 
it, most undoubteclly I should have brought the question 
before your Lordships. I mill not say what the effect of the 
debate might have been, but, at any rate, before the war had 
been entered into, this House anel the country would have 
known what the policy of the Government was, and would 
have been able to express an opinion as to whether that policy 
was right or wrong, and whether we were t o  drift into the 
war in which we are now engaged. 
As I have said before, this is nst simply a personal 
question. I n  dealing with distant countries great confidence 
must be placecl in Her Majesty's Government, and great: 
discretion must be used by those who differ from them. O n  
such questions a Minister is required to be more careful 
than in dealing even with European questions. I have said 
what the assurances given were, and I have now to state what 
were the circumstances at the time they were given. do f a r  
from Her Majesty's Go~e~nment  ot having de~ired to enter 
into any definitive treaty engagement, an endeavour had been 
made to negotiate a treaty with the Ameer; and so far from 
there having been no change in our relations with the Ameer, 
on the 15th of March, 1877, the assurances that hacl been- 
given to thc Ameer-of protection in the event of attack or 
of internal disturbance-by Lord Lawrence, Lord Nnyo, 
and myself, hacl been withdrawn under the instructions of 
the British Government, any expectation of support from 
;us had been repudiated, and he had been told that we were 
under no engagement except that of the Treaty of 1855, 
,under which there was no obligation on our part exc5pt to 
;refrain from interference, and to leave the Ameer entirely 
to himself. I was perfectly astounded by the condition of 
khings revealed by the despatch adclressed to the noble 
.Marquis by the Viceroy on the 10th of May, 1577, which 
must have been in the hands of the noble Marquis at the 
time he gave the assurances in the House of Lords in June, 
1877, of which I have spoken. It is with deep regret I am 
obliged to say this; it would not be right, the question 
having been put, and the answer having been given, if I did 
not give my deliberate testimony that the statement then 
made by the noble Marquis gave rue a completely incorrect 
impression of what the real facts of the case were. 
I am not going now to enter into the general. policy of 
&he war; but I lllust say that I do not think the noble Duke 
.behind me (the Duke of Somerset) was quite fair in his 
semarlis a b u t  the noble Lord, a late Governor-General (Lord 
Lawence), for having joined the Afghan Committee. If my 
noble friend had done such a thing in the sense of supporting 
the Afghans against the British Government, no language 
.would be too strong to be used in the circumstances. But as 
matters stand, I am surprised at the noble D~ike's condemna- 
&ion of my noble friend. He  has an opinion that the war is 
dght. Very good ; but my noble friend thinks it is unjust 
and impolitic-an opinion in which I myself all1 very much 
disposed to concru with him. The noble Duke says that my 
.noble friend is not patriotic ; but he would appear not to be 
patriotic simply because he differs from the noble Duke, and 
expresses the earnest opinions which he holds. Few nen in 
this country have given such proofs as my noble friend has 
given of patriotism, of vigour, of honour, and of a desire at 
any risk to maintain the British Empira in India ; and yet, 
because he does not happen to agree with the noble Duke, he 
is to be spoken of in such terms. It is repugnant to all my 
feelings of justice and to every sentiment of propriety that a 
man of such distinguished services should be so spoken of in 
this House. My noble friend has a perfect riglit to express 
his opinions on the causes of tlzis war, and to say whether he 
txnlis it just or unjust. It is fol-tr-tnate that we have men 
like him in the country, who know something of our former 
relations with Afghanistan, and who can correct statements 
which have been made and despatches which have been, 
published by the knowledge which they possess. 
One thing more. With regard to the Amendment pro-. 
posed by the noble Earl (Earl Grey) I hope it will not be. 
pressed to a, division. LTnfortunately, this discussion has 
assumed a somewhat personal character. Nobody more, 
regrets that circumstance than I do ; but from that very fact,. 
if the Amendment were to be pressed, y o u  Lordships would 
be asked to vote upon a proposition which you have not yet 
had an opportunit,y of fully and completely discussing. At 
the same time, I must confess that 1 concur entirely withi 
that part of the argument of the noble Earl which rests 
upon the Act of 1858. I hold that it is not right for any 
Administration carrying on war o~~tside India to apply the. 
revenues of that co~~ntry towards the expense of such war 
without the pre~ions consent of Parliament. I n  this case 
therewas plenty of time before the declaration of war for the 
Government to have summoned Parliament and explained 
their policy ; therefore, that would have been a proper and a 
Constitr~tional course, because there can be no d o ~ ~ b t  that the. 
Prerogative of the Crown is limited by Act of Parliament,. 
and, although it is the Prerogative of the Crown to declare, 
war, at the same tinze the clauses of the Act of 1858 proscribe- 
the course that shodd be followed under the circumstances. 
I t  has been a matter of estxeme regret to me to be placed 
to some extent in collision with the noble Marquis and the 
noble Viscount opposite. I have endeavowed since I; 
retzlrnecl fro111 Indin to abstain from making unnecessarily 
any observations on Indian affairs. I can say with perfect 
sincerity that, both in and out of Parliament, I have 
endeavoured to look at Indian affairs entirely apart from 
party politics; and I should not hesitate for a moment to, 
express my opinion as strongly with regard to anything done 
by those on my own side of the House as with regard to the- 
conduct of noble lords opposite. 
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MT LORDS,-In addressing some remarks to your Lord- 
ships this evening, I mish to commence by espressing the 
gratification which I have felt a t  the gallantry which has been 
shown by Her Majesty's forces i n  t he  field in Afghanistan. 
I wish also to express my confidence in  the officers in command 
of those forces, Sir Samuel Browne and General Roberts, 
who have conct~~ctecl successful operatiorls in the field, and 
General Stewart and General Biddulph, m-ho have had no 
such opportunity yet, but who I am sure will justify their 
reputation whenever they have tha t  opportunity. Having 
been personally acquainted svith those officers, I believe that' 
better selections could not have been made. The spirit which 
Her  Majesty's British and Native forces have evinced cannot 
be surpassed ; and I may be permitted to say that the general 
efficiency of the army is, in my opinion, mainly due to the 
administration of my noble and gallant friend, Lord Napier 
of Magclda, who mas for many years Commander-in-Chief in 
India, and of my gallant friend, Major-General Sir Henry 
Xorman, who for a long period was Secretary to the Govern- 
ment of India in the Military Department, and afterwards 
the Military Member of the Council of the Viceroy. The 
general arrangements for the campaign, so far as we know 
them, reflect great credit upon the  Commander-in-Chief in 
India, Sir Frederick Haines, who will, I am sure, satisfactorily 
discharge his responsible dnties ; and particularly upon the 
Quartermaster-General's Depal'tment of the In&an army. 
I must further espress my satisfaction, but not s~~rprise, at  the 
expressions of loyalty reoeived By the  Viceroy from Native 
Princes of In.clia, some of them m y  personal friends. The 
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Maharaja of Gwalior and others have offered their personal 
services-and those of their troops. Having so recently filled 
the office of Viceroy in  India, I cannot pass these offers by 
without expressing my  gratification. 
I will now say a few n-ords on the main question 
raised b y  the Address to the Crown. Your Lordships 
are asked to assent to the al~plication of the revenues 
of India to defray the espenses of the war in Afghanistan. 
My Lords, I entirely agree with my noble friend who 
recently filled the office of Governor of the Presidency 
of Madras (Lord Napier and Ettricli) in regretting the 
course which Her Majesty's Government lmve talcen. 
It would have been right, just, and generous to have 
decided at once that no portion of the espense should 
fall upon the revenues of India. I consider the war to be 
the direct consequence of the state of afl~irs in Europ?, and 
not to Izave arisen from anything immeciiately connected Tvith 
our Indian Empire. For that re,xson, if for no other, In3ia 
~houlci not be called upon to bear the cost. Moreover, India has 
suffered recently from two severe famines ; the people are 
impoverished; and the state of the finances is far from 
satisfactory. True, the noble Viscount opposite (Viscount 
Cranbrook) toId us that the Government of India expects a 
scrplus of amillion and a quarter this year above the estimates; 
but this is exactly what I anticipated in the discussion of last 
year. The reason of this s u ~ ~ > l u s  is flint c s t m  taxation 
has been unnecessarily imposed upon t h o  people of India 
for the purpose of raising what is called a Famine Fund. 
The new taxes, which press upon the poorer classes, and 
which I believe to be unpopular and impolitic, ought to be 
taken off as soon as the condition of ihe finances will allow 
of it. 
I entirely agree with what has fallen from the noble Earl 
on the woolsack, that i t  would be a s~lbject for regret if Indian 
questions came to be regarded as party cpestions. I h a ~ e  never 
considered them to be so ; and it was rathey a gratification to 
me to hear the complaint of the noble Duke (the Duke of 
Somerset) that there had been no great nloeting of the Liberal 
party called together upon this question. As regards the speech 
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of the noble Viscount who introduced this subject j'l'iecouut 
Cranbroolr) I have nothing personal to complain of. H e  is 
correct in saying that there has been no reticence on the part 
of tile Government in producing papers, and he has a perfect 
right to criticise my public conduct. I am the last person to 
conlplain of any such criticisms. What I am now about to 
say is the result of my actual experience in India. The noble 
and learned Earl on the woolsack has given an account of the 
objects of the Britis'l Government during the last ten 
Years in dealing with Central Asia and Afghanistan. During. 
that period there have been two Administrations-five Sears 
under Mr. Gladstone m d  five years under the noble Earl  op- 
posite. I was Viceroy in India during two years under Mr. 
Gladstone's Administration and two years under that of the 
noble Earl, and as far as I know, and so far as my dealings 
with these affairs enable me to form an opinion, I have cot 
been able to find out any difference ~vll%teve~, during that 
period, in the objects which the British Government desired 
to secure vith regard to the progress of Russia in Central 
Asia or to our dealings with Afgl~anistan ; bearing in mind, 
of course, that the general lille of pclicy must be modified 
by the progress of events. 
Having filled the high office of Viceroy in India, I think 
i t  is absolutely necessary, to avoid any misconception in 
discussing the policy of the British Government towards 
Russia in regard to Central Asia, for me t o  say that the 
Government of India, while I had any connection with it, 
was not actuated by the fear of any attack upon India 
by Russia. 'CVe never believed t l~n t  such an attack was 
possible, and me were of opinion that if anything of the 
liind were possible the st2ength of the British Empire in 
India and in this country was amply sufficient to render 
such an attack futile, and clisastrous only to those who 
might make the attempt. The Govelnments of England 
and of India have never looked upon the progress of 
Russia in Central Asia with the eyes of that school of 
which Sir Henry Rawlinson, who has been po ted  Isy the 
noble and l'easned Earl on the woolsack, is the most able 
I n  1869 the Government of India said :- 
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" 'VVe by no means share i n  the exaggerated apprehensions expressed 
in ~llaily quarters as to  the danger 60 British rule in India vhich nlay 
arise from a n  extension of Russian influence in those countries lying to 
t h e  s o ~ ~ t l ~  and East of her enormons possessio~ls in Asia. 
" We believe that the influence of a civilised European power over 
wild and savage tribes cannot be otherwise tlliln beneficial. 
" We would therefore heartily assist in  establishing a, frank and 
clear understailding wit11 Russia as t o  the relative position of British 
and Russian interests in Asia." 
I n  accorciance with these principles, they suggested 
that, 85 it was for the interests of both countries that a 
wide border of independent States shoulcl exist between 
the British and 12ussian frontiers, it would be desirable that 
Russia should be invited to adopt the same policy with 
regard to the inclepencleilt States which came under her 
legitimate influence, as the Government of India had 
pu~sued  with regarc1 to Afghanistan and the i~ldependent 
States within their influence. 
Her  Najesty's Government entered into negotiations. 
with ltussia with this ohjeot. The negotiations, commencecl 
by Lord Clarendon and continued by Lord Granville, lasted 
for several years. Finally, Russia accepted in 1873 the 
boundary of Afghanistan suggested by the Government of' 
India in the time of Lord Mayo, and it was arranged that 
Russia should, to t,he best of her ability, prevent the Native 
States on her side from creating any disturbance in 
Afghanistan ; while we, on the other hand, engaged to. 
exercise OUT influence to prevent the Ameer of Csbul from 
transgressing the boundaries of his dominions. These 
negotiations took place uncier the Admiuistration of Mr. 
Gladstone. Again, ~ ~ n d e r  the Administration of the noble- 
Ear l  opposite (the Earl of Beaconsfield) similar negotia- 
tions took place in 1875. The Government of India 
entirely oonc~ured with the views expressed by the- 
Home Government in those negotiations; and one- 
of the last despatches I sent home when I mas Viceroy 
espressecl the concurrence of the Government of India in the- 
arrangements made by the noble Earl now sitting on the- 
cross benches (the Earl  of Derby). It is but fair to the- 
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which they had entered. 
The noble and learned Earl on the woolsack ancl the 
noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Cranbrook) have accused 
the late Government of tilniclity in their communications with 
Russia, and alluded to a paragraph in a despatch of the 310th 
of June, 1573, in which the Government of India, when I 
was Viceroy, suggested that IIer Majesty's Government 
should make a plain declaration to the ltussian Governiuent 
that the British Governmellt would defend Afghanistan 
in the event of unprovoked attack ; and they have said that 
this mas not done. The Government of Inclia always urged 
upon Her Majesty's Government, -perhqs in terms a Little 
stronger than the Foreign Secretasy of the day may have 
liked, the expediency of speaking in the plainest langnage 
to the Eussian Government both of the indepenclence of 
Afghanistan and of the inconvenience which might arise from 
the progress of Russia in the dixection of India. I do not want 
to pit the policy of one Government of EIer Najesty against 
another; but as that policy has been indiscriminately attacked 
by one member of the present Cabinet, I am afxaid I cannot 
depend upon other nienlbers of the Cabinet to defend it. 
However, in the Centrd Asian Papers lately laid before 
Parliament there is a, despatch written by the noble Earl 
on the cross benches (the Earl of Derby) to Lord Augustus 
Loftus in June, 1877, in which the noble Earl quotes a 
despatch from Lord Granville, clsutecl January Yth, 18'74, 
and says :- 
" His L0rcls1~i~ thougl~t it right to state ct~lldiclly i~nd at once to 
the  Russian Governniellt, that the indepenclence of Afglianistan was 
regarded by Her Mi~jesty's Governlllellt as a matter of great 
importance t o  the welfare and security of British India, and to the 
tranquillity of Asia." 
This cleclaration made by Lorcl Granville in 1874, was. 
plain and distinct. 
The Governme~lt of India in 1874 were much concerned 
about some probable movemerlts of the Russians in the. 
direction of Nerve, not on account of any qprehension 05 
1 
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danger to British India, but because of the probability that 
:such an advonce would lead to clifficulties between Russia 
and Afghanistan ; and at the time when the late Government 
.resigned that question was particularly prominent. The 
Government of India wrote pressingly to the Home 
Government to speak frankly to ltussia, to tell her of the 
inconvenience which might arise fro111 that advance, and to 
*do what was possible to prevent it. The noble Earl who 
was then Secretary of State fol. Foreign Affairs (the 
Earl of Derby) wrote in the strongest terms to the Russian 
Government, and said that the advance of the Russian 
.arms in the direction of Merve mould impose on Her  
-Majesty's Government the necessity of making a correspond- 
i n g  advance in order to allay apprehensions and to remove 
misconception from the minds of the people of those countries. 
On reading those words and the worcls used by Lord Gmn- 
qille in 1574, I felt that the intention of the Government of 
Jndia had been fully carried out by Her Majesty's Govern- 
ment. It seems to me, therefore, that the inference drawn 
1,b.y the noble and learned Earl on the voolsack and the noble 
';Viscount opposite as to the collcluct of Mr. Gladstone's Govern- 
lment, and of their 0%-11 Gover~~inent, is entirely unfouncled. 
Both Governments, not.ivithstanding the objections of the 
!noble and leariled Earl, actually used much the same 
.language to Russia as the Government of India, rightly as 
I believe, had suggested. 
With respect to the opinions of Her Majesty's present 
(Government on the position of Russia in Central Asia, i t  is 
hardly necessary to do more than to refer to the speech of 
.the Plime Minister in the House of Coivillons in May, 1576, 
,xv11en he said that he was "not of that school who viewed 
,the advances of 12ussia into Asia with those deep lnisgivings 
aEollie do." I-Ie said that Asia was large enough for the 
destinies of both Russia and Englnnd. " At no time," 
lie added, " has there been a better understanding between 
the Courts of St. Janles and St. Petersburg than at the present 
I moment ; and there is this good unclerstnnding because our 
l'olicy is a clear and a frank policy." I tllinlr that those 
I were wise words. They seem, from fhe papers laid before 
of the probability that 
culties between Russia 
en the late Government 
lnrly prominent. The 
singly to the Home 
sia, to tell her of the 
m that advance, and to 
The noble Earl who 
Foreign Affairs (the 
t terms to the Russian 
-ame of the Russian 
?uld impose on Her 
! making a correspond- 
:nsions and to relnove 
ople of those countries. 
1s used by Lord Gran- 
of the Gove~nlxent of 
Ier Majesty's Govern- 
! the inference drarn 
roolsack and the noble 
r. Gladstone's Govern- 
is entirely unfounded. 
the objections of the 
;eel llluch the same 
t of India, rightly as 
Ier Majesty's present 
n Central Asia, it; is 
refer to the speech of 
zlnons in May? 1876, 
2t  school who viewed 
hose deep misgivings 
rge enough for the 
I. '' At no time," 
[el-s tanding between 
$ than at the present 
anding because our 
I think that those 
papers laid before 
Parliament, to hare given f;reat sati$action in ~ u s s i a ,  snd 
they show that the policy of both Govel-nrnents towards Russia 
waBy Up to that time, one and the same. 
80 much for oily policy .with regard to Itussia. Wit11 
regard to Afghanistan and other nei@bouring States, the- 
policy of the Indian Government was thus espressed by 
Lord Mayo, before he died, in a despatch of the 19th of- 
January, 1872 :- 
“Tile carclind points of the foreign policy wllicll the Governlllent of ' 
India ~11onlJ. steadily pursue m,zy be briefly described as follows :- 
We ahoulcl establish with our frontier St:~tes of Klleht, Afglianistall, 
N i l 4  and Burn~eh nad possibly at some future c1;~y with Yarlrund, 
intimate relations of frienclsllip ; we slloulcl ,il,bke tllern feel that 
though we are all-pomerful, we hixe 110 ~ ~ i s h  to encroach 011 theis 
authority ; but, on tlie contrary, t ln t  onr earllest desire is to 
support their paver and ma~ntaiti their nationality ; ancl that  if severe 
necessity arise we might nssist them wit11 nloney, arnis, tind erhaps, 
? =? 
i n  certain eventualities, with nlen. We could thus create m these* 
States ontWorks nf our Empire, a11[1 n8s11ring tllenl that t h e  ~ 1 : ~ s  of 
annexation are p,~ssed, make thexu 1,rsctic;~lly feel that tlley llave 
everything to  gain and notlling to lose by ccnileavt~urnlg to deserve our 
favour and support. " 
The noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Cranbrook) seemed, 
the other night., 1.0 have some difficulty in describing what 
our " settled policy " towards Afghanistan ~nvss. If the 
noble Viscount had been longer in the Inclia Office he 
would have found out that the policy was clear anc? 
decidecl. 1 do not want to add anything to the esplanaition 
1 h,zve reacl, and I have read i t  because the policy ought to 
stand clearly before your Lordsl~ips. When Lord Mayo was 
in Indin the first application that he had to make of that 
policy Jvas in dealing with Afghanistan, in consequence of 
the arrangements mzlcle by his predecessor, Lord Lanrrence,. 
for the support of Shere Ali, and that a meeting should take 
place between him and t,lze Viceroy. I am not going over 
again the history of the Umnballa meeting. Although Lord 
Maiyo, when he met Shere Ali, coulcl not comply with all his 
wishes, the result of the conferences which then took place- 
mas by no means unsa;tisfactory. I wish to acld my 
tosfimong to the testimony of those noble lorcls who have sai8 
ira this House that the personal influence and the generous 
confidence inspired by Lord Mayo were of substantial public 
advantage in dealing with the Native Princes of Indis, 
and almost, if not quite, disarmed the suspicions of one who 
was the most susl3icious of a s~~sl~icious race. 
H y  Lords, Shere Ali was not less suspi~ious when, 
in  the year 1873, I had to enter into some negotiations 
with him. 1 will not trouble your Lordships with any 
long account of the Simla negotiations, they have been so 
much before the House. All that I shall say is that upon 
that occasion, having received authority from Her  Majesty's 
Government, I gave fihere Ali assurances in respect to 
assistance from the British Goverllllleilt under certain 
chcunlstances very much in the terms I read just now when 
describing the general policy to be pursued towards States 
which adjoin British India. There were in the speeches of the 
noble Viscount (Viscount Cranbrook) and of the noble and 
learned Earl on the woolsack certain statelnents with regard 
to  those negotiations which I cannot accept. Of course I 
know that the assurances which I gwe  to Shere Ali did not 
come up to the espectations he entertained. A t  the same 
tinid, when the noble Viscount brings forward the Prime 
she  minister of Shere Ali, who conducted the negotiations 
in  1573, as evidence to show that the assurances which I 
then gave were vague, I cannot accept the estract read b y  
the noble Viscoullt as conveying s correct account of the 
views of the Prime Minister. The noble Viscount read an 
extract from the conference between the Prime Minister and 
Sir Lewis Pelly, on the 8th of February, 1877, which d l  be 
found at page 204 of the Afghanistan Papers. It is true 
that the P i h e  Minister then said that the nature of the 
assistance to be given to Shere Ali was left obscure, both in 
my writings and sayings : but this ren~ark applied only to  
my f i s t  interview with the Prime Minister, and if the 
noble Viscount had taken the trouble to read the report of the 
nest conference, on the 10th of February, given in the very 
nest page of the papers, he would have found that the Prime 
Minister proceeded to relate how he had afterwards discussed 
the subject completely with the Foreign Secretary, and how 
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T h e  Prime Minister, (who, I must say, gave a very accurate 
account of the transactions of 1873,) throughout the con- 
ferences with Sir Lewis Pelly in 1877, so far from 
.complaining that the assurances given by me in 1573 were 
vague and undefined, was actually trying t o  meet the com- 
plaint put into his mouth by Sir Lewis Pelly that they were 
vague and inco~lolusive, and that therefore it mas necessary 
t o  make a new treaty with the Ameer. 
There were, no doubt, some causes which led the 
Ameer to be dissatisfied with the Government of India. I n  
the f is t  place, both he and the Persian Government were 
dissatisfied with the arbitration which the British Govern- 
ment 11ad undel-talien, and ~vhich was ably and impartially 
carried out by Sir Frederick Goldemici, to settle the boundary 
of the two countries in Seistan. Then 8here Ali was offended 
.at the advice I gave him to keep faith with his son Yakoob 
Khan. I need not defend my conduct in haying done this for 
no noble lord has taken esception to it. !Phe noble Viscount 
(Viscount Cranbrooli) having been so short a time in office 
aannot be espected to  know much about these details; but 
he entirely misapprehended the facts of the case when he 
charged me with having sent the message to the Ameer by s 
*' common messenger." My Lords, I sent it by the ordinary 
channel of colam~~nication with the Ameer-the Native 
Agent of the British Government who was resident at 
his Court. That mas, in fact, the only channel of com- 
nlunication I could have employed, and i t  was precisely 
the same channel which was used by Lord Lytton to 
conduct the late negotiations with the b e e r .  The noble 
and learned Earl on the woolsack-and 1 cannot say that I 
am surprised at any error into vllich he may have fallen, for 
%he subject is very complicated nncl di5cult-has said that 
there was a great contrast between my letter and that written 
to Shere Ali in regard to his son Yakoob by General 
Kaufmann, the Russian Governor-General of Turliestan, in 
fhe year 1875. 
The LORD CHANCELLOR : It mas in the year before. 
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The EARL OF NORTHBROOK : I understood the noble 
and learned Earl to say 1875; but the letter was written by 
General Kaufmann before I vent to India. I n  fact, it was 
written in 1871, when Lord Mayo was Viceroy, and related to 
different events. I feel that I need not dwell long upon the 
other ground of coaylaint which the Ameer had against the 
Government of India-namely, the sending a Native gentle- 
man to carry a present to the Ruler of TVakhan, who had 
been civil to some British officers who had visited his 
neighbourhood. There was some misapprehension about this 
affair which I esplainecl to the Ameer, but I insisted upon 
his permitting the messenger to proceed, as I thought his 
objections were unreasonable. The noble Viscount has 
commented upon this transaction as if I had been disposed to 
go to war with Afghanistan upon the matter; but your 
Lordships will readily understand that there mere other 
ways of clealing with the Ameer if he had refused ; and, in 
fact, he did what I wished. 
-1s regards all these sources of complaint on the part of 
the Ameer, I apprehend that no noble lord would wish the 
Government of Inclia to have done everything which 
tlie Ruler of Afghanistan wanted them to do. That mould 
have been a course entirely undignified and quite improper. 
I hold that the Anleer hacl no reasonable ground of com- 
plaint, and I thiulr I clicl what mas right and reasonable 
towards him. Let us look, however, at the general result of 
this policy, which I have said was the policy of two 
Governmeuts, in Irldia and at  home, during the whole time 
that I Imns Viceroy and also in the time of Lord Mayo. 
There was no difference wliatever in the policy of the two 
Governments. "0th wanted to give reasonable assurances 
of protection to the Ameer, and both desired to Beep on good 
terms with him. The result was fairly satisfactory. W e  
wished that the Ameer shoulcl keep peace with his neigh- 
bours, and that 11e should follow our advice in his foreign 
affairs. H e  wanted to make an attack on Bokhara, but 
he abstained from doing so upon our advice. H e  nest 
q~~arrelled with the 'Dersians about Seistan ; nevertheless, in 
consequence of our ad1-ice, he accepted our arbitration, and 
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as far as I know he loyally kept his word. I advised him to 
give no assistance to the Turkomans; he acted upon my aclvice, 
and moreover, a t  my request, he tried to induce them to give up 
to the Russian Government some Russian subjects who hacl 
been captured and macle slaves, in  order to prevent a, 
quarrd between Russia ancl the Turliomans which might 
have brought the Bussians to ~erve!  Then, as to his domestic 
affairs, I am not aware .that the Ameer had any serious 
quarrel with me about them, with the exception, perhaps,, 
of m y  aclvice to him about Yakoob Khan. H e  asked me in 
1874 to do what I could with the Persian Government to induce 
them t o  give a civil answer to his letter anno~mcing the nomi- 
nation of Abcloola, J a n  as his heir. That did not look like the 
act of a man who was hostile to the British Government and 
wished to quarrel with it. The most important thing he 
did just before I left Inclia was to bring entirely within his 
control the country bordering on the Turkoman frontier, 
not very far from the boundary which was laid down between 
England and Russia as that which was not to be transgressed- 
He communicated with us. W e  wrote home to the Govern- 
ment asking them to inform the Russian Government, 
and I believe the noble Earl on the cross benches 
(the Ear l  of Derby) communicated with Russia. Al l  this 
shows that ,that was contemplated by the Governments of 
Mr. Gladstone and of the noble Earl opposite (the E a r l  of 
Beaconsfield), namely, to remain on good terms with the 
Ruler of Afghanistan and to keep him a reasonable ancl 
sensible being who should not quarrel with his neighbq~us, 
was maintained up to the time when I left India. I d o  not 
like to quote my ovn clespatches, but the account I gave in 
them of the state of mincl of the Ameer was very much like that 
which I have now given to y o n  ~ordshi~2s. l  I beliew now- 
not on my own authority, but on that of everybocly who 
knew anything about it-that the Ameer was then loyal, 
in  the sense that he had not the slightest inclination to 
turn to Russia for s~1ppol-t. On the other hmd, he was a 
little "touchy" on certain things! Ontwo occasions the Govern- 
ment of India wrote to the Secretary of State when I was 
Viceroy that if he wo~11d treat him with patience, and  not 
press upon him certain things unnecessarily which were 
distasteful to him, there was no doubt that he would 
remain our good friend. We felt that he was an Asiatic, 
and should be treated with patience as such by his European 
neighbours. 
I know the noble Marquis opposite (Salisbury) entertains 
a different opinion from that which I hold, in comlnon with 
everyone with whom I have conversed who has filled a 
responsible position in India, upon the disposition cf She~.eAli. 
'The nobie Marquis, of course, has a perfect right to his o m  
opinion, but he ought not to cast a slur upon a distinguished 
servant of the Government of India which is entirely 
andeserved. I n  a despatch of October 4th, 1877, the noble 
Marquis, referring to the state of mind of the Ameer when1 
left Inclia in 1876, said :- 
" This (the course of events) demonstrates but too plainly how 
erroneous was the opinion expressed so recently as 1875 by Sir R. 
Polloclr, the Commissioner of Peshawur, that ' no unfavouriible change 
hacl occurred in the disposition of the Ameer.' Shere Ali's co~lfidential: 
Envoy stated explicitly that his inaster liad ' now a deep-rooted mistrust 
of the good faith and sincerity of the British Qovenlmcnt.' " 
Sir R. Pollock tells me 11e is unable t o  correct this state- 
ment himself, because he has very properly felt it to be his 
duty, in consequence of the confidential position he so recently 
occupied at Peshawur, to consider his lips sealed, and to take 
no part directly or indirectly in the discussions that have 
taken place about the Afghan war. My Lords, the opinion 
given by Sir R. Polloh was quoted by the noble Marquis 
from the despatch of the Government of India of the 7th of 
June, 1875, ancl it was given, not in 1875, but in the 
beginning of 1874, and therefore before the incidents about 
Yakoob Ehan and the despatch of a messenger to Wnkhan 
had occurred. But, besides, your Lordships will see in s 
moment how unfair the statement of the noble Marquis is 
with respect to Sir R. Pollock. It is perfectly true that 
Shere Ali's Prime Minister said to Dr. Bellew in n lx-ivnte 
conversation on the 28th of Janua~*y, 1877, ~vliicl~ will be 
found at page 196 of the Afghanistan l'apers, that " tlie Amcer 
had a deep-rooted mistrust of the British Government, an4 
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that he had many reasons for that distrust," bLzt it appears 
from that ~~nversation that the 111ain reason for that 
mistrust was the endeavour to force British officers upon 
him. No doubt the Prime Millister alluded to other 
matters, but this was, all through the conferences, the 
principal ground. of his complaints ; and therefore-I am 
sure perfectly unintentionally-the noble Ila3[arquis mns in 
 error in attributing any mistake to Sir Ricl~ard Pollock. 
I regret that the noble Marquis should have thrown 
any doubts upon Syud Boor Mallomed's character 
by saying that his statements were obviously insincere. 
I t  is true that his history isliie a cllapter froin the " kab ian  
Nights." He travelled once with a string of horses from 
'one end of India to the other, and eventnally rose to be the 
trusted Minister of the Ameer, and serred his master ably 
and loyally. A further statement was mncle by him, 
as will be seen by the papers, when he was lying 
ill. Dr. BelIew went to see him and the statement 
he then made mas very pathetic. He  said, " This is 
a very serious business. It is the last time the Ameer 
will treat vith the British Government. You must 
not impose upon us a burden which mre cannot bear, and if 
you overload us the responsibility rests with you." The doctor 
asked him what burden he referred to, an4 he replied, " The 
residence of British officers on the frontiers of Afghanistan." 
This, my Lords, is enough t o  show $hat the state of the 
Ameer7s nlij.d as represented by his 71-inle Minister 
arose mainly from the endeavour to force resident British 
officers upon him, directed by the noble Marq~~is himself 
in 1876, contra~y to the opinion of Sir R. PoJlocli and 
to that of every officer who had a knomledge of 
Afghanistan. 
I said that when I left India the Ameer was loyal to 
the British Government. Whether he was inclined to turn 
tomacis Russia is the main point. I t  was said by the noble 
Viscount (Viscount Cranbroolr) that after the negotiations of 
1873 the Ameer at once turned t o  Russia. What proof is 
there for that statement ? I mas sml.prised to hear the opinion 
of our Native Agent at Cabd quoted in support of it, and 
at the nianner in which the noble Viscount spoke of 
the reports of the Natire Agent. The noble Viscount said 
it vas  easy to see that his reports were all rubbish. Our 
Native Agent was a Mohammedan gentleman of high 
character and stancling, Nawab Atta Mahomecl Khan, who 
did good service in the Nutiny, and received a ha~dsome 
reward from Lorcl Lytton for his services at Cabnl. 
Englishnzen are not the only people who can clo anything. 
Many Natives can ancl do render goocl service to the 
British Government. In October, 18TG, OLT Native 
Agent went to Simla and saicl that the Ameer clid not 
suspect us of conspiring with Russia to his prejudice, nor 
that the British covetecl any pcrtion of his territory; the 
Ameer was well aware, he saicl, that Russia sooner or later 
woulcl attack Afghanistan. The Agents of Russia, he aclded, 
were regarded by the Ameer as a source of embarrassment, 
That statement was made at a formal interview, and in a 
private interview with Captain Grey he said "that the 
Ameer nras clesirous of sectwing a pied d fe~*?.o in British 
territory vhither to send his family ancl property when lie 
cleared for action with Russia." I s  it possible in the face 
of those statements to eay that a t  that time he was unfriendly 
to England ancl friendly to Russia ? 
The noble Earl on the woolsack-who, by the way, 
in commenting upon the letters of Shere Ali to General 
Kaufmann, although he is doubtless accnstomecl, as he said, 
to interpret English clocumen ts, stl.angely rnisinterpretecl the 
value of the ordinary terms of comlsliment enlployecl in the 
East-after giving an accowt of the negotiations of 1573, 
t~unecl round and asked -whether any of your Lordship 
would have refused to p a n t  what was then asked by Shere 
Ali ancl refused by me. I have aiain to come between one 
member of the present Aclministration ancl another, and to  
say that in his remarks acldressed to me the noble and 
learned Earl was at  the same time conclemning LI 
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Government. I had the honour of serving as Viceroy for 
two years under the Administration of the lloblc Earl 
opposite (the Earl of Beaconsfield). w h a t  lhapl~ened i n  
1874 ? There was a debate in your Lorclsllips' House in 
-which the sc 
discnssed ; a 
Government 
in tha t  Ltdeba 
Ali what he 
potection. 
& 
years after 
Shere Ali tl 
single desp: 
hint  to t h  
(Cranbrook 
gu2rantee 
says that tl 
arms of n 
the mble  8 
t o  obtain tl 
Is there a 
' t o  the AI 
mas made 
be given 
so that I T 
Shere Ali 
for sonle 
against m 
against tl 
merabers. 
this matt< 
-4 
I do no 
m o n g  in 
ment \TO 
unconditi 
f f  OOPS, TV] 
return. 
said by tl 
given ELI 
ha, 
been no ( 
i n  India 
the frie 
.iscount spoke of 
oble Viscount said 
: all rubbish. Our 
tntleman of high 
homecl Ichan, who 
'eived a handsollle 
3rvices at Cabul. 
1 can clo anything. 
od serxice to the 
376, our N a t i ~ e  
e Ameer did not 
his prejudice, nor 
his territory; the 
in sooner or later 
f Rnssia, he aclded, 
sf embarrassment. 
nterview, and in a 
Le said "that the 
ci t c ~ * r c  in British 
property when he 
possible in the face 
he was unfriendly 
vho, by the may, 
"e Ali to General 
ltomed, as he said, 
misinterpretecl the 
t employecl in the 
otiations of 1873, 
)f your Lordships 
en asked by Shere 
come between one 
1 another, ancl to 
me the noble and 
ndemning 111 s o ~ m  
ing as Viceroy for 
f the noble Earl 
That liappenecl in 
rdships' I-louse in 
which the subject of the negotiations of 1573 vas thorougllIy 
discussecl; and what was then the opinion of the present 
Government ? The opinion of the Government, as expressed 
in that debate, was that it was q ~ ~ t e  impossible to give Shere 
Ali what he wanted-namely, an ~nlconditional guarantee of 
protection. BLI~  is that all ? I servecl as Viceroy for t ~ v o  
years after that, and did I receive any instructions to give 
Shere Ali the ~~nconditional g~larantee he wantecl 2 Not one 
single despatch ; not one single expression ; not one singIe 
hint to that effect. 'cIlere," saicl the noble Visconnt 
(Cranbrook), "is what ought to have been clone-tile 
guwantee ought to have been given," and the noble Earl 
says that this was the thing that drove the Anleer into the 
arms of Eussia. But look at  the two deslsatches in which 
the mble Marq~rls opposite (galisbury) instr~zcted me in lS75 
to  obtain the admission of British Residents into Afghanistan. 
I s  there a single word about giving additional assurances 
to  the Ameer ? Not a worcl ; no suggestion wl~atevel- 
was made that any greater assLwances of support should 
be given to him than I had given in 1873. So ~ L X C I I  
so that I mas obligecl to reniincl the noble Marq~~is  that if 
Shere Ali entertained the proposal, he would be certain to ask 
for some retun.  Therefore, I say that the charges brought 
against me by noble Lords opposite are really charges 
against the Goveimnent of which they themseivzs are 
members. There can, in  fact, be no distinction &awn in 
this matter between the present and the late Government. 
I do not accuse the Government of doing anything 
wrong in the matter, for I do not beLiere any Govern- 
ment mould do such a thing as to give Shere Mi an  
~~nconclitional guarantee of protection-arias, ammunition, 
troops, whatever he liked-without asking for anything in 
return. This is what he asked; ancl this is what it is now 
saicl by the noble Earl on the woolsa~k that I ought to have 
given him. 
!-I. have shown that cl~wing these eight years there had 
been no change of policy. The objects of the Governments 
in India and at home were the same ; we all wanted 
the friendship of Afghanistan; our difference mns as to 
the means of sec~ving it. In 1576 I received a despatoh from 
the noble Marquis pointing out the desirability of our having 
it British Resideat at Herat. I should have liked to have 
had on that frontier a British officer. I was not against 
the measure. Do not suppose I had the least desire 
to oppose i t  ; but I thonght i t  well to consult the officers of 
the Government who knew most about the matter. I was on 
the point of proceeding t o  Delhi. When I arrived there I 
consulted the Lieutenant-Governor of the PunjBb, and all t he  
most experienced officers of the frontier. I also s~mmoned 
two Native gentlemen of high character, who had been the  
Agents of the Gorernlnent of Inciia at CCsul, and who I i n y  
the h u e e r  vel l :  one of them was the Nawab Gholam 
Hussein Khan. I did not hold a, formal conference, but I 
saw all thase officers privately-one at  a time-and aslied 
them how the request ~ v o ~ ~ l d  be likely to be entertained by 
Shere Ali, and mhat woulcl be the best may of making it. 
They saicl that the admission of British Residents into 
Afghanistan vas the one thing which the b e e r  disliked 
more than another, and which was most likely to get 
xs  into trouble with him, and I nlade them write 
down their opinions that I might send them home. 
After that I had all the papers on the subject looked out 
and examined to see if there was any information which 
would warrant us in assuming that Shere Ali would receive 
a British Agent at Herat. The noble Narquis Tpas under 
that impression. H e  mote  to the Government of India 
that '' the Ameer has more than once in former years 
exl)ressecl his readiness to permit the presence of an Agent 
at Herat, ancl it is therefore not possible that, if his  
intentions are still loyal, he will make any serious difficulty 
now." I was under the impression myself that at some time 
he  might have said something to that effect. W e  found that 
Lord Mayo, at Umballa, had distinctly told the Ameer that 
he would not be asked to receive British officers in Afghanis- 
tan ; but we thought that he might have said something in 
private conversations to the effect that he might accept them 
elsewliere than at Cabnl. W e  wrote this t o  the Secretary 
of State, adding that what might have passed then co~dcl 
not 
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not fairly be used in any negotiations with the Ameer. 
Bu t  since we examined into this matter in 1875, 
it has been set at rest by the evidence of Mr. Seton 
gar r ,  who was Foreign Secretary to Lord Mayo at Umballa, 
and was therefore completely acquainted with all that  
took place. Mr. Seton Karr came to me of his own accord 
the other day and sdd-'LI want to tell you that it is quite 
mistake to suppose that anything of the liind was ever said 
by the Ameer." Not only is Ms. Seton Earr's recollection 
clear on the point that Shere Ali never expressed his willing- 
ness to receive British officers in Afghanistan, but he gave 
an  account of what occurred in a letter to Lord Lawrence, 
written on the 5th of April, 1869, immediately after the 
conferences at Umballa; which he has authorised Ee to use, 
and which contains the following passage :-" He " (Shere 
d l i )  "is told that we don't want British officers as Besiclents 
at Cab~d or anywhere else, and he says they would clo him 
harm in the eyes of his people." Lord Mayo's official 
account of what took place has been strangely misinterpreted. 
It has even been said that the mission of British officers to 
Afghanistan was a boon which he denied ,to Shere Ali. 
This, however, is an error which is refuted by a private letter 
written on the 3rd of June, 1869, by Lord Mayo to the Duke 
of Argyll, in which Lord Mayo, summing up the UmbaIla 
conferences, wrote "the only pledges given were that we 
would not interfere in his affairs ; that we would support his 
independence ; that we would not force European ofEcers as 
Residents upon him against his nish." 
I n  June, 1875, the Government of India gave their opinion 
that it would not be wise to force British Residents on the 
Ameer. We thought i t  might lead to trouble, and, as servaots 
of the Government, we thought it our duty to point that out. 
There vas no hurry about the matter ; and having been told 
by every oae whose opinion was of any valuejthat the course 
proposed was likely to alienate the Ameer, we stated our 
opinion to the Government; but the Government, notmith- 
standing the unanimous opinion of the Viceroy and his 
Council, replied that the course they had suggested must be 
followed. Again the Government of India, in January, 
1876, pointed out the evil effects which in their opinion 
would follow from carrying out the instructions of the noble 
Marquis. in the hope that the matter might still be recon- 
sidered by Her Majesty's Government. 
I n  February, 1876, however, Lord Lytton, before leaving 
England, receivecl distinct and positive instructions, both 
written and verbal, to insist that Shere Ali should receive 
British Residents in Afghanistan. My Lords, I do not 
wish to say a word against the proceedings of Lord Lytton ; 
I know the clif3culties and responsibilities of a Viceroy, and 
Lord Lytton seems to me to have carniecl out the instruotions 
which hc received.  h he responsibility rests, not upon him, 
but upon Her Majesty's Government. And here it is 
necessary to remember that there was no change of circum- 
stances which made it necessary then to alter our relations 
with Afghanistan, for, as I have already shown to your 
Lordships, the Prime Minister declared in May, 1876, in 
&he House of Commons, that the relations between Great 
Britain and Russia had never been more satisfactory. 
The first step that was taken in India was to request Shere 
Ali to receive Sir Lewis Pelly at Cabul. On his declining to do 
so he was warned in July, 1876, that if he persisted he would 
isolate himself from the alliance and support of the British 
Government. Ny Lords, I consider that this was the 
turning point of the negotiations with the Ameer, and we 
know that three members of the Viceroy's Council, 8ir 
Henry Xorman, Sir Arthur Hobhonse, and Sir William 
Muir, dissented from the course which was then followed. a '  
As some exception has been taken to their conduct in making 
thek dissent known, I must explain to your Lordships that 
the Government of India is not a government by a Viceroy, 
but by a Viceroy in Counoil; that ordinary matters are 
determined by the majority, and it is only in regard to 
matters essentially concerning the interests of India 
that the Viceroy has the power by law to overrule 
the majority. By statutory rules, framed by the 
Viceroy in Council under the Government of India Act, 
Members of Council have a right to express their dissent from 
any act done by the Government of India. These three 
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Members of Council expressed their dissent at the time. The 
Viceroy requested them to postpone the formal record of their 
dissent until a despatch was sent home reporting the pro- 
oeeclings ; but for some reason or other no despatch was sent 
home for a great length of time, indeed until May, 1877, 
when dl three had left India. I do not blame Lord Lytton 
for cletaining the despatch, for I do not llis reasons; 
and I must add that I do not think it vas done for the 
purpose of preventing the dissents from being recorded. 
Lord Lytton is an exceedingly able miter, and neecl 
not be afraid of answering any objection that might be 
raised by Members of his Council. But whatever the 
reason may have been, it is totally contrary to the 
practice that the course of important affairs sho~11d not 
be frequently reported to the Home Government. AS 
those Members of Council were debarrecl from the usual 
opportunity of recording their dissent from the course 
taken in July, 1876, I have no hesitation in expressing my 
opinion that when the despatch of the Government of India 
of the 10th of May, 1877, was made public, they were fully 
justified in also making public their dissent. If they had 
not clone so i t  must have been supposed that they were 
oonsenting parties to the policy describecl in the despatch as 
having been p~srsued by the Government of India when they 
were members of that Government, and responsible for its 
action. 
To return to the negotiations with Shere Ali. ' The next - 
important step followed in October, 1876, when the b e e r  1 
was plainly told that if he did not receive British officers 
a 
i n  his territories he woulcl lose all the protection he 1 
hacl hitherto obtained from England. A t  one time it was 
thought fie wo~ild not give way ; but '( owing to helplessness " 
i 
he said he must agree to the demands of the British 
J 
Government. H e  said, in substance,-Let my Envoy meet I 
Sir Lewis Pelly, explain my difficulties, and if after this the I 
Viceroy will not give way, I must. I 
My Lords, I should like to dwell somewhat upon the 
oonferences at Peshamv, but time forbids it. I have no 
fault to fincI with the lnanner in which Sir Lewis Pelly 
carried out the instructions which he had received; he 
certainly carried them out with great determination. H e  
began by telling the Prime Minister that the Viceroy deshed 
to remove some misapprehensions in the mind of the Ameer. 
The Prime Minister replied that the Ameer had none ; and 
when he was told that these misapprehensions had arisen out 
of the conference with Lord Mayo at Umballa, and the com- 
munications with Lord Northbrooli in 1873, the Envoy said 
that the Ameer went away from Umballa perfectly satisfiecl, 
and that the communications with Lord Northbrooli in 1573 
were satisfactory also. %%.at weighed most in the b e e r ' s  
mind, he said, was the policy of the present Viceroy, 
which was different from that of previous Viceroys, in 
forcing the Ameer to receive British officers as Residents 
in Afghanistan, contmsy to the Treaty of 1867 with Dosk 
Mahomed, and to all the '' agreements," " wsitings," anct 
" assurances " he had received from Lord Lawrence, Lord 
Mayo, and myself. The conference concluded by Sir Lewis 
Pelly, at the Prime Minister's request, submitting his objec- 
tions for the consideration of the Viceroy. Sir Lewis Pelly 
was then instructed to demand a distinct and prompt answer 
whether or no the Ameer refused to receive British officers 
in  any part of Afghanistan. On this point, however, no 
answer was ever given in consequence of the death of the 
Prime Minister. It is a very extraordinary thing that no 
explanation has been given why this demand was not pressed 
further, for it mas clear that the object of the British 
Government was to place British Residents in Afghanistan ; 
and there is reason to believe that under great pressure, and 
under great apprehensions, the Ameer would have given 
way. Indeed, it appears i5om the despatch of the Govern- 
ment of India of the 10th of May, 1877, that Lord Lytton 
h e w  that another Envoy was on his way from Cabul, who was 
reported to have " authority to accept eventually all the con- 
ditions of the British Government." Sir Lewis Felly was 
nevertheless instructed, on the 30th of March, to close the 
conference at once. 
.f Something has been said of the conduct of the Ameer 
at that time as justifying the close of the negotiations. It 
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the negotiations. It 
seem@ that he had been raising the cry of " jehad,"' 
or of a religious war, and using hostile language towards. 
the British Government. My Lords, I am not going to 
defend this s~~spicious Ameer, for I think he behaved very 
foolishly throughout these transactions. But it is only fair to 
look at  the ciirc~mstances under which he was then placed. 
The occupation of Quetta occurred in Octobe~, 1576, just at 
the time when the Ameer was most frightened at the menac- 
ing language of the British Government. Prepmations were 
made about the same time at Rawul Yindee to assemble a 
force ; a bridge was thrown across the Lndus, and I believe that 
arrangements weye actually made to send a column 11p to 
the ICurram Valley, which is on the direct route to Cabnl. 
Besides this, the Viceroy had recently seen the Maharaja 
of Cashmere and encouraged him to advance against some 
territory on the North-East of Afghanistan, over which Shere 
Ali claimed sovereignty. Xothing is said about all this in 
the papers laid before Parliament, but there is no doribt 
about the facts. They have been stated in Pa~li~ament 
without contmcliction. The truth seems to me to be that the 
poor b e e r  coxild not form any other conclusion than that the 
British Government were on the poillt of attacliing him, stnd i 
he turned to every side to see what defence he co~dilcl make. 
H e  found, however, that the ~eople around him did not wish 
to quarrel with the British Government, and we are told by 
the Government of India that the whole movement had 
" completely collapsed" before the close of the Peshawx 
Conference. 
,'The conference was closed in Karch, 1877. When the 
Viceroy closed the conference he took away from the 
Ameer ewry assurance that he hacl received of .pro- 
tection and support from Lord Lm~ence, Lord Mayo,. 
and myself, either for himself or for his dynasty. 
H e  withchew our Native Agent from Cabul, and therefore 
deprived the Ameer of the means of communicating 
with the British Government ; and perhaps the noble Narcpis 
opposite mill explain door was then left open to the 
Ameer. Neither the noble Viscount (Viscount Crankrook) 
nor the noble Earl on the woolsack have allndecl to the real 
result of the Pesbamr conferences, and the noble Viscount 
described the position of affairs most inadequately in his 
despatch of the 28th of November last, by saying that we had 
assuulled towards the Ameer a position of '' vigilant reserve." 
X y  Lords, these were the circuillstances of the case. I think 
the course pursued mas not wise. When the Gavel-nment 
found that the Ameer was not willing to receive British 
Residents in Afghanistan, they need not have altogether 
broken off from him, or have led him to feel that 
he had nothing to expect from the British Govelmment. 
I f  a different course had been taken, and time had been 
given him, his feelings mere such that he would, I believe, 
in the end have accepted their terms, however hard he 
might have thought them to be. 
Than came a time of real difficudky, when it was necessary 
that closer relations should be maintained with Afghanistan. 
That necessity arose on account of the political oonclition of 
Europe, England and Russia having been graclually brought 
t o  the verge of vw. It would then have been right to have 
strengthened our relations with the Ameer, but in what 
position hacl Hey Majesty's Government then placed this 
country with reference to Afghanistan ? By lmshing forward 
clemnnds which were not necessary, contrary to d l  Indian 
advice: when there esisted no crisis whatever, they had so 
alienated the b e e r  that it would hare been ~lmost  
humiliating then to have made any advances towards 
him. The Secretary of State (Viscount Oranbrook) 
used an expression in regard to the state of things in 1973 
which is far more applicable to the policy of 1876, namely, that 
" it was too late." The policy of Her Majesty's Government 
made it "too late" to make a friend of the Ameer 
when i t  was really wanted. I t  may be said that I o~xgl~t not 
to content myself with offering criticisms on the conclnct of 
the Government, but should indicate what I think ought 
.to have been done. I say that if the Ameer hacl not been 
frightened about the reception of British Residents in 
Afghanistan, the moment there was a probability 
of a war between Russia 2nd England the Viceroy 
#ought to have eomuu~nicatecl with him, arranged for 
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,z meeting, ancl offered to enter into an agreement -7ith hinz 
similar to that entered into with his father in 1557. I 
satisfied that he wolfid have reacEly accepted sllch an offer. 
T h e  policy of the Government, however, prevented that being 
done, ancl this, I believe, was one of the maJn causes of the 
m-ar. 
Then came the last stage of these transactions. The 
Ameer was alienate$ from us, he had no hope of sul,port 
from us, he had no Native Agent of ours at his COLU~. j-t 
TVaS arranged at  Simla in 1873, that if he were aekecl to 
receive a Russian Mission he sho~llcl at once cons~dt he 
Government of India ; but this ~vas impossible as our ru'ntit-e 
Agent had been mitbdrawn. The ~ & e r  had been told that 
we clicl not care either about him or his dynasty. When, 
therefore, the Russian Mission was pressed upon him, as he 
I co~~lcl look for no protection from us, he had no alternative 
but to accept it, and it seems that he clicl so ~~nwillingl~. 
When this mas first known, it appears to me thnt the 
Government of India rightly intimated to Her Majesty's 
I 
( Gove~nmeot in their telegram of the 30th of July thnt the 
1 matter was one which ought to be settlecl betveen the 
f 
i British and Russian Governments, and not between the 
British Government and Afghanistan. When England and 
Russia were on the verge of mr it is true that neither 
country could fairly be held to be bound by the anange- 
i a e n t s  of 18'73 or 1875 in regard to Central Asia. But before the Rrnssian Mission reachecl Cabd the Treaty of 1 Berlin hacl beer. signed, md I agree mith the noble Earl on 
I the cross benckes (Earl of Derby) that the Government should 
have clealt with Russia and not mith Afghanistan. I 
believe, moreover, that they migllC have come to a peaceful 
ancl satisfactory understanding with Rnssia, and ha-ie 
avoided the present war. Russia was asked, no doubt, to 1 aithchaw tbE Ehission from Cab111 ; but I m s~uprised at the 
satisfaction expressed by the noble Earl on the woolsack at 
I tile cnswer received to that demand. In fact, having recei~ed 
j no satisfactory answer from Russia, Her Majesty's GOT-ern- 
I merit went to war with Afghmistan. 1 not d ~ e i i  on the circlunstnnces connected with the denpatch of Sir xevilb 
I 
I 
@haml~eflain's Xission, because from the beginning I can 
only regard it as a declaration of war. 
X y  Lords, I have trespassed so long npon your ind~zlgence 
that I shall say no lllore escepting that I believe this war 
va s  unnecessary, and that vi th the esercise of a little 
common prudence on the part of Her Majesty's Government 
it might have been avoided. No advantage, I an1 con~-inced, 
can result from it, either to England or to India ; and holcling e 
these 6.ews I feel myself reluetnlltly obliged to vote for the 
alllendnlent proposed by lily noble friend behind me. 
Sational Press Agency, Limited, loci, Shoe Lane, E.C. 
I T" RESULTS OF THE AFGHAN IVAR. 
1 T1lx curtain has fallen on the secdnd Afghan Far almost as suddenly 
as it rose, and the public-in so far as i t  is represented by the London 
Press and the London world-seems almost ashamed at baving been 
1 deluded into taking an interest in  so small and ephemeral a matter. 
' A reaction of this nature is perhaps the natural consequence of the 
I exaggerated tone which was taken a t  the outset by the opponents of 
t he  war, in regard to  its character and the risks that it involved. 
The late Lord Sandhurst, it is well known, aBirmed a few years back 
t h a t  it would not be safe to adrance on Candahar with a less force than 
' 30,000 men, and the expense of such an enterprise was popularly esti- 
mated a t  twenty millions of money. We mere told, indeed, that our 
so-called ' Jingoism in the East ' would inevitably lead either to  
national disaster or national bankruptcy ; and now, because these 
sinister predictions have not been realised, but, on the contrary, a 
short, inexpensive, and not inglorious campaign, skilfully conducted 
and bravely supported, has been crowned xith a peace promising 
substantial political results, Re are taunted with having made a 
mountain of a molehill, with having raised a hobgoblin for the mere 
purpose of laying it, and, in  fact, with having betrayed the nation 
in to  a needless and unseemly exhibition of alarm. 
I cannot take blame to myself for having fallen into either of these 
: wo errors of exaggeration. P certainly never gave any countenance, 
In the  one hand, to the supposed military difficulties of invading 
, Qfghanistan : on the contrary, I almays anticipated that at  Candahar 
, -e be received as liberators by the great majority of the p o p -  
cl ;tion, and I further stated my conviction that the Afghans were 
.: ,jut feeble enemies in the field, so feeble, indeed, that a small veil- 
' appointed British force might march triumphantly from one end of 
, the country to the other ; but on the other hand, I believed then-as 
! ' believe now-that India mas last year threatened with a real and 
: ;-,rmidable danger, which required to be met with an earnest and 
%. ,,ilful frontage of defence ; and I may add that i n  my opinion this 
1 anger, although averted at the time by the fearless attitude 
i. jgorous measures of the Viceroy, and thrown still further 
5-~Vir VT -No. 30. c C - 
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background by the conditions of the Treaty of Gandamak, may 
any moment revive if our vigilance relax, or if, under the influec 
I of party feeling, our recent political action i n  Asia should by so 
1 futllre Government be reversed. 
It is important that we should realise to ourselves the nature 
extent of the danger whicli threatened us, if we would appreciate 
true value of our line of defence, and I address myself therefor 
1 the fist instance to this consideration. I f  the Berlin Conference 
fallen through in the summer of last year-and for weeks, it mus 
I 
remembered, the issue trembled in the balance-it is almost certain 
there would have been a Russian military occupation of Afghanist 
support of Shir Ali's authority, Kavfmann's force, which had adv 
to  Jam, being thrown across the Oxus upon Herat, while an au 
column strengthened the Afghan position a t  Cabul ; and we 
have been thus committed to a n  immediate conflict with ou 
European rival on the Indus as well as on the Bosphorus. W 
Treaty of Berlin, however, was signed on the 13th of July, the 
programme underwent a considerable modification, and the 
upon our Indian frontier assumed a different form. 
paration for direct hostility, the Russian object was now shifte 
acquisition of a dominant position at the Court of Cabul, from whence 
a friendly communication might be kept up with the neig 
Indian States, and a preliminary skirmishing array of intrigue an 61 to the immc 
agitation might be directed against the Indian border. The mai ot more than t m  
feature of the new line of attack was, of conrse, the establis anks  of the Aks 
Stolitoff's mission a t  Cabul; but there were many subsidiar 
tions of hardly less importance-preparations, indeed, which, as th iY 
proved abortive, have not hitherto received much ontiers of her E 
which, if they had been unchecked by our invasion, might 
developed into very serious causes of annoyance. What may 
the precise conditions of the proposed Russo-Afghan alliance 
transpired, though no doubt the confidential' corresponden 
Kaufmann and Shir Ali which preceded StolitoFs mission 
been placed in the Viceroy's hands by Yaciib Khan ; b 
go far wrong i n  assuming that  the Russian treaty 
mutatis mutamdis, would have been very much the sam 
that is, it would have provided for the exclusive Russian 
Afghan relations with foreign Governments, exactly as we have pro- f rom the  Shign5 
vided in a contrary sense for retaining that control i n  our own hands. with the tribes 
A further light is thrown on the aggressive policy of 
proceedings at other points of the Afghan frontier ~ i m u l  
her diplomatic venture at  Cabul. She seems for a lon 
have !+cast a, covetous and curious eye on the passes leading idow 
direct upon India from the Upper Oxus valley, judging-and judgin 
truly-that a post near these passes, either a t  Sarik-kul, or Siphad 
Vakhzin, or even a t  Panjah, would not only protect and consolidate 
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h e r  recent acquisition of territory on the Pamir plateau, but would 
also serve as a most convenient position for pushing her further 
reconnaissance to the south. From such a point, indeed, in one 
direction, she might communicate with Cashmir through Yassin 
a n d  Gilgit, and in another with the semi-independent States north 
of the Cabul river, through Mastfij and Chitr%l. During last 
autumn Russia thus launched three tentative expeditions upon the 
region in  question under the guise of geographical explora- 
tion. The first expedition led by M. dshanin, after successfully 
pushing on along the old Mohammedan road from Hissar to Rasht, 
a n d  tracing the Surkhkb through Karategin to the junction of the 
M u k  river, Tvas unable to force its way from the glacier-fed 
sources of this stream over the heights of the Trans-Alai range to 
Pamir ,  and the spirited leader of the party was unable, therefore, to 
realise his hope ' of writing his next letter from Sarik-kul or Darkut,' 
t h e  latter name applying to the famous pass on the Cashmir frontier 
where ]poor Hayward was murdered some fifteen years ago. The 
second party, led by 3f. Severtsoff, which had been originally 
detailed for service with the eastern column of the Afghan expedi- 
tionary force commanded by Abramoff, approached nearer to the 
promised land at the sources of the Oxus, having crossed the Pamir 
from north to south by the lakes Rara-kdl, Rang-kdl, and Yeshil- 
kfil to the immediate vicinity of the Shignzin villages, so as to leave 
n o t  more than twenty or thirty miles of unvisited country, along the 
banks of the Aksu or Morghhb river, between the respective limits of 
English and Russian survey. The political importance of this last 
exploration is considerable ; for Russia appears to extend the elastic 
frontiers of her Kokand dependencies in harmony with the advance of 
h e r  surveying parties to the south, and she may thus cIaim to have 
n o w  annexed the whole of the Alichdr Pamir, instead of stopping 
short  at  the Aksu or Morghgb rivex, which, being a longer and larger 
stream than the Panj, is regarded by geographers as the true Oxus, 
forming, under the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1872, the northern 
boundary of the Afghan territory.' Severtsoffs orders appear to have 
been  to carry his survey up to Victoria Lake, and beyond into the 
Vakh6n  alley, which would have brought him within hail of the 
coveted passes ; but a failure of provisions compelled him to return 
from the Shignhn border. A more direct attempt to open up relations 
wi th  the tribes witbin the great range, and who have always been 
Inore or less connected with India, was made by Colonel Matveyef, 
who, accompanied by an astronomer and topographer, actually pene- 
trated, in September last, to Fyzabad, the capital of BadakhshQ, 
and ,  in virtue of the Russian alliance with Shir Ali, claimed 
from the Afghan governor escorts and introdnctions to the chiefs of 
1 See Enqlasd and 
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to the influential position already secured by Major Biddullph 
in the mountains, as to the suspicions of the Badakhshani ruler, 
rnho not unnaturally mistrusted his scientific visitor : otherwise 
a basis of Russian intrigue might hare been established a t  Mastfij, 
which mould have demoralised the tribe chiefs of DardistBn, 
as far as the frontiers of Peshawer. At the same time Russia, 
taking advantage of Shir Ali's friendlilless, despatched an officer, 
Captain Bykoff, to  survey the Oxus from the junction of the Surkhlib 
[or Yakhsh) to Petro-Alesandrofsk, with a view to determine the 
fitness of the great river for steam navigation. This survey was 
eminently successful. The Oxus vas provecl. to be navigable as high 
up as the frontier of Badakhshgn, and though up to the present time 
there is only one vessel, the ' Samarcand,' employed in the navigation, 
and, omiag t o  difficulties about the supply of fuel, she has not ascended 
higher than Ichoja-Saleh, where the Afghan territory commences, i t  
may be taken for granted that before long a steam flotilla will be esta- 
blished on the river, to  the great advantage of commerce and with the 
certain effect of impressing deeply both Afghans and Uzbegs with the 
power and resources of the Russian Government. The most significant 
step, however, that was taken by Russia during this halcyon period of 
her relations with Cabul was to employ Colonel Grodekoff, an accom- 
plished officer of the Etat-Major, to survey the route from the Osus 
to Herat along the line by Sir-i-pG1 and Mymeneh, which leads 
direct from the Russian head-quarters at  Samarcand. Colonel Grode- 
koff, having accomplished this duty in a very masterly manner, 
continued his reconnaissance through KhorassBn to the Caspian, and 
lzas now, it is said, joined the staff of the Turcoman army, in order to 
give General Lazareff the benefit of his experience on the advance of 
the Russian troops towards the great centre of interest a t  Herat. 
From these several indications there car1 be little doubt, I think, 
but that Russia, although restrained from active hostility against 
England by the European pacification guaranteed under the Treaty 
of Berlin, did nevertheless, in disregard of the spirit of that Treaty, 
contemplate a continued adverse pressure upon India through the 
establishment of a strong political influence in the countries to the 
south of the Oxus ; Herat, Cabul, and Badakhshgn being the positions 
to which her attention was especially directed as the most favourable 
stand-points for maintaining and directing an insurrectionary pro- 
pagandisrn. A certain diplomatic reticence has been observed-and 
very properly-in all our Ministerial declarations, as to how far the 
Afghan war was precipitated by the proceedings of Russia, or to 
wbat extent it aimed at  counteracting her policy. The indignities 
and injuries which we had sustained at the hands of Shir Ali, 
together with the necessity of rectifying our 'haphazard' frontier 
a l o ~ g  the Indus valley, were put forward as the ostensible causes of 
the war. With the exception, indeed, of two notable instances 
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of plain speaking-first, the famous declaration of Lord Lrtton, in 
the Simla manifesto of 1878, that 'the British Government would 
not tolerate interference on the part of any other Power in the in- 
ternal affairs of Afghanistan ; ' and, secondly, Lord Salisbury's cate- 
gorical demand for the withdrawal of Stolitoff's missioc from the 
Court of the Amir, as at variance with the repeated pledges given 
by Russia that Cabul was beyond the scope of her political action- 
there has really been nothing to draw public attention to the impor- 
tance of the Russian factor in our dealings with the Afghan question ; 
and yet in reality that factor was the essential element of the whole 
transaction. It was especially to counteract Russian influence that 
we originally embarked in the mar, and-which is still more to the 
point-it is the third article of the Treaty of Gandamak, binding the 
Amir to conduct all his foreign relations in accordance with the ad- 
vice and vishes of the British. Government, which constitutes the 
touchstone of our present success and gives us our best assurance of 
security in the future. On the satisfactory nature of the general / 
principles involved in the treaty there cannot be two opinions. It 1 
is just the sort of agreement that we might have required Uost Ma- 
homed Khan to sign when we gave him back his country in 1842- 
with the solitary exception, perhaps, of the clause relating t o  a per- 
manent British Resident at Cabul-and which, at  any period from 
that time to the present, would have fulflled all our legitimate ex- 
pectations in regard to the Afghan alliance.' Our main object has 
ever been, since the date of Lord Auckland's famous Simla Manifesto 
of 1838, to obtain the establishment of ' a strong friendly and in- 
dependent power' on the north-western frontier of India, without, 
however, accepting any crushing Liabilities in return ; and this is 
what seems to have now for the first time been placed within our 
grasp by the provisions of the Treaty of Gandamak. This treaty, 
indeed, is not more remarkable for what it specifies than for what it 
omits ; for while the third article disposes once for all of the Russian 
pretensions and at the same time guarantees the Cabul State against 
foreign pressure or aggression-a responsibility which, although not 
previously formalised, must in reality always have attached to us- 
i t  carefully avoids that much more embarrassing obligation of a per- 
sonal or dynastic guarantee against domestic enemies. In presence 
of a danger which menaces the safety of India we are content to 
pledge the resources of the Empire, b ~ ~ t  in view of the vicissitndes 
of civil warfare which do not immediately concern us, whether re- 
sulting from misgovernment, or faction, or family competition, we 
retain a perfect liberty of action, according to the exigencies of the 
time. It is probable that Major Caragnari had to enco~~nter some 
importunity on this latter point, for in  the many-headed family of 
Payendeh Khan there will always be pretenders discontented with 
their lot and ready, if the occasion offered, to strike in for power ; 
-- 
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and against such disturbers of the peace a British guarantee would 
have been a most acceptable security : but Yaciib Khan was no 
doubt early disabused of any expectations he may have formed on 
this head. It was probably pointed out to him that, fortified with 
the prestige of a British alliance, and commanding through the 
subsidy the best means of acquiring popular support, lle was placed 
in a position immeasurably superior to all competitors, while there 
was the  further obvious argument in his favour, that, so long as he 
was competent to govern and loyal in his relations t o  his ally, i t  
must be to our interest to strengthen his position so as to enable 
him to  put down disorder or disaffection upon the frontier. But 
whatever may have been the exact scope of the discussions which 
passed between Cavagnari and Yac6b Khan a t  Gandamak, i t  is at any 
rate a matter of congratulation that we have escaped from the en- 
tanglement of a personal guarantee, and the more so as on former 
occasions this question was made the crucial test of our sincerity, and 
upon it, indeed, the Simla negotiations of 18"1 are believed to have 
been finally shipwrecked. 
It may seem to be an ungracious-almost an unpatriotic-task 
to expose the weak points, if there are any, of the alliance that we 
have formed. Napoleon's famous advice ' to wash dirty linen a t  home ' 
has become proverbial, and no doubt there are occasions when it may 
be inexpedient for a Government to take the public too much into its 
confidence ; but in  regad  to our Afghan policy, I am disposed to 
deprecate any attempt a t  concealment. If, as is asserted by Lord 
Lytton's critics, we blundered into war and have still more blundered 
into peace ; if the barrier that we have sought to establish on the north- 
west frontier of India be no barrier ; if the hollowness, the insecurity, 
and the expense of our Afghan alliance constitute an evil not less 
hurtful or far-reaching than Shir Ali's direct hostility, then let the 
miscarriage of our policy be made known while there is yet time to 
retrieve our position. Of all possible political dilemmas a fool's para- 
dise is the worst. It is in  a spirit, then, of strict impartiality, with 
no desire to exaggerate our advantages or to ignore the dangers of 
the future, that I proceed briefly, and according to such lights as I 
possess, to estimate and compare the pros and cons of the Treaty of 
Gandamak. 
The value of Yacdb Khan's engagement to place his foreign re- 
lations in our hands and to be guided entirely by our advice, depends 
of course, in  the first place, on the stability of his power. That 
power cannot be regarded at  present as completely established. There 
is insurrection in Badakhsh&n, where Mir Baba Khan, the nephew 
of the hereditary chief Jehandar Shah, has with the assistance of the 
chiefs of Shign&n and Darwiiz-both of whom, i t  must be remembered, 
are more or less dependent upon Bokhara, and through Bokhara up on 
Russia, whose acquiescence in the enterprise was thus indispensable 
every opl 
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t o  its success-lately expelled the Afghan Governor, and proclaimed 
his own independence of Cabnl. There is some reason to apprehend 
that  a similar revolution may be attempted at Herat, ~vhere Yac6b 
Khan's own brother, AgGb Khan, who vas for many years, during 
Shir Ali's lifetime, a refugee and pensioner at Teheran, is reported 
t o  be inclined to throw off his allegiance to Cabul, hopin; 0 to revive 
that  condition of voluntary vassalage to Persia which, although un- 
recognised by treaty, has been the normal condition of the \Testenl 
Afghan Principality, almost from the time of Yar 3Iah0med'~ death. 
There are likely also to  be troubles at Sir-i-pG1 and I1I-j-meneh and 
even a t  Balkh, where Uzbeg influence has always to a certain extent 
prevailed, and where Abdur-Rahman, YacGb Khan's most formidable 
rival, may be expected, unless withheld by Russia, to avail himself of 
every opportunity to foment intrigue and disaffection. But vith all 
these drawbacks, the prospect is not on the whole unfavonrable. One 
of the best informed, indeed, of the Afghan nobles, the son of that 
arch-intriguer, NCr Mahomed Shah, who died a t  Peshamer during 
the Conference, lately stated it as his opinion to our Political Agent 
at Candahar that ' Yaciib Khan mould have little &fiiculty in esta- 
blishing himself firmly on the throne, not because he was S& Mi's 
son or because the people liked him, but because he mas our nominee ; ' 
and this sentiment has been repeated in numerous quarters, and by 
the best authorities in the country. For my own part, having already 
committed myself to the opinion that if we had continued our s u b  
sidy to  Shir Ali Xhan, after Dost J'lahomed's death, 'he would have 
nipped insurrection in the bud and thus escaped iive years of inter- 
necine war,' I am only too rejoiced to see the error of 1863 redeemed 
in 1879, and confidently anticipate that success for the son which, 
under similar circumstances, I predicted for the father, although in 
the meantime local difficulties have no doubt increased, and the 
situation has been much aggravated by Russia's mingling in the 
fray. 
The next question to consider is the rectification of frontier. 
Now, it seems to me that, in  so far as regards local requirements, an 
undne impo~tance has been given to the distinction between a 
scientific ' and a haphazard ' frontier. No frontier, however scien- 
t%c, unless it be constructed on the scale of the great wall of Chins, 
can be locally effective as a barrier against the inroads of barbarous 
tribes. If, indeed, we had secured every great pass in the Sulim&n 
range by military posts a t  the upper as well as the lower encl, so as 
ice take the Taziri tribes and their allies in reverse, we still couldnot 
haye dispensed with police patrols for the protection of the villagers of 
&he plain against raiders from the hills, who might swarm down upon 
any exposed point from the multitudinous minor ravines. All that we 
seem to have aimed a t  in the treaty, and all that has been  roba ably con- 
templated since the frontier question calve into prominent notice, 
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has been the establishment of certain posts upon the Afghan border 
which would afford the greatest combined amount of political and 
military strength-political strength in dominating the regions be- 
yond with a view to moral support as well as to pressure, and military 
strength in obtaining commanding strategical positions that might  
serve equally for attack and defence. 
The political question may be first considered. The Khyber 
Pass is not perhaps naturally the most convenient avenue of 
approach to  India from the north, but it has now oome to b e  
considered the high road of communication, and as long as the Afghan 
capital remains a t  Cabul, and the British frontier head-quarters are 
fixed at  Peshawer-to say nothing of the convenience of the Indus 
bridge a t  Attock and of the railway from Lahore to be extended 
to that point-so long will this line form our chief object of atten- 
tion. It will excite no surprise, therefore, that in the interests of 
commerce, as well as to strengthen our position a t  Peshawer, we 
should have decided permanently and effectively to occupy this cele- 
brated defile from its mouth to Lundi Khana (together with the  
parallel pass of Michni) ; not, however, taking over t h i ~  narrow strip 
of land from the Afghan Government either in  cession or assignment, 
but assuming the passes to have always belonged to the independent 
Khyber tribes, who at  the beginning of the war formally transferred 
the control to our hands on certain definite conditions of service and 
subsidy, which conditions are still, and will continue to be, in force. 
It is probable that, for a time a t  any rate-so inveterate are t h e  
lawless habits of the Pass Afridis-the maintenance of a free com- 
munication through the Khyber may be a task of dificulty and 
danger. The Government of India, indeed, has shown its sense of t h e  
importance of the duty by naming a special officer to the charge ; 
but as time rolls on and the security and convenience of regular 
monthly payment is contrasted with the risks of plunder and the  
fluctuations of a compulsory black-mail, it is hardly possible t o  
doubt but that the tribes will be gradually humanised and brought 
under effective control. A more serious inconvenience may perhaps 
be felt in the jealousy and distaste with which the Cabul authorities 
must naturally view our appropriation of a strip of country over 
which in  ordinary times they may not have exercised jurisdiction, 
but to which they have always asserted a territorial right, and where, 
indeed, they have put that right in force by garrisoning Ali Masjid 
whenever the military necessity for such an occupation has arisen. 
The most important frontier arrangement, however, in its effect 
upon our relations with Cabd, is no doubt the retention in  our own, 
hands of the protection and administrative control of the district of: 
Kuram. This extension of our military frontier, giving us, a t  a. 
minimum of cost and responsibility, a commanding hold upon Cabul,. 
was strongly advocated by Sir Herbert Edwardes more than twenty 
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Years ago, and the scheme vould have been probably carried out, 
either then or a t  a later period, as a means of support to Dost 
>lahorned Khan's authority, but for the uncompromising opposition 
of Sir John Lawrence, who, indeed, as it is well known, would, as 
a measure of policy, have surrendered all our Trans-Indus possessions 
to the  Afghans. Sir H. Edwardes pointed out that the Kuram frontier 
was but five marches from Cabul through the open and fertile valley 
of Logur ; that the Bangash and Tiiri tribes, who formed the great 
bulk of the inhabitants, mere opposed to the Afghans both in religion 
and nationality, and thus naturally looked to the English for protec- 
t ion ; that the communication between Kuram and our base on the 
Indus valley was perfect ; that the net revenue, amounting to about 
10,0001. per annum, would meet all the expenses of civil government, 
and that the location of a force of four or five thousand men in the 
valley mould place our frontier defences on a footing of unassailable 
strength. Sir H. Edwardes' recommendations have not been implicitly -- 
followed under the present arrangement, the district being onlj 
temporarily assigned to us, and the force detailed for the occupation 
being considerably below his estimate ; but the essential point advo- 
cated by him has at  any rate been secured, a British garrison being now 
established in a position which politically dominates Cabul, and gives 
us, moreover, a strategic post of immense importance, either for 
offence or defence. The boundaries of the Kuram district are to be 
settled by a Commission. They will probably not include Khost, 
which our recent experience has shown to be much exposed, though 
the  entrance to that valley will always be commanded by our post at 
Thal  ; and it would further, perhaps, be a prudent act of deference to 
Afghan sensibilities if our direct control mere not extended beyond 
Ali Kheil, the administration of the hill country between that point 
I 
and the Shutar-gardan, which has hitherto appertained to Kuram, 
remaining with Yaciib Khan's officers, subject, however, to our friendly 
A supervision. It is hardly to be expected that the Mangals and Jhjis, 
tribes of pure Afghan extraction, who have given us so much trouble 
during our recent occupation, will at once settle down into peaceful 
citizens; but even if they continue their depredations, the mode of 
dealing with them xi11 be a mere question of police and devoid of 
political significance. 
Our general political interests are more involved, perhaps, in the 
Pishin cluestion than in that of the Khyber Pass or of Kuram, On 
a 
t h e  broad ground of protecting India from invasion or from hostile 
demonstration from the west-and this ground constitutes, i t  must 
be remembered, the main political value of Afghanistan-there can 
3 be no doubt of the extreme importance of Candahar ; and great dis- 
' appointmeat has been accordingly expressed at our avowed intention 
not  to maintain that position. Having occupied the city without 
resistance ; having overcome all difficulties of carriage and communi- 
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with our base; being on the best terms with the inhabitants of 
the province-for the isolated attacks of fanatics cannot be held to 
Titiate the generally friendly bearing of the people; enjoying the 
amenities and the sanitary blessings of an admirable climate; 
with ample shelter for our troops, and with supplies of all descrip- 
tions-not only necessaries but luxuries-pouring in upon us in 
profusion; why, i t  is asked, should we voluntarily surrender all 
these special advantages, the fruits of our conquest, and retire 
witKn the I<hoja-Amr5n hills, mhere eve17 convenience of settle- 
ment has yet to be created? The answer is simply this, that the 
principle of the retrocession of Candahar mas indispensable to the 
success of our negotiations and general arrangements with Yaciib 
Khan. ?Trhether he would have consented t o  a peace which did 
not provide for such a territorial restoration may be doubted; 
but even if he had so consented under pressure i t  would have been 
almost suicidal on our part to  have accepted his acquiescence. Our 
object, i t  must be repeated, mas to create a strong friendly and 
independent pomer ' on the north-west frontier of India ; whereas, if 
we had forcibly dissevered Candahar from Cabul, Werat would have 
infallibly followed suit, Turkestiin would have next seceded, and the 
Afghan monarchy mould have been irretrievably split up and de- 
stroyed. Under certain conditions-that is, if Cabul were decidedly 
hostile, as she threatened to become during the later years of Shir 
Ali's rule-this dismemberment of the Afghan State might not be an  
undesirable consummation, but it was manifestly not to our advan- 
tage to risk such a catastrophe at the present time, with Russia and 
Persia matching eagerly for an opening to interfere ; and we have ac- 
cordingly very properly, as I think, resisted on broad political grounds 
the temptation to include Western Afghanistan among the assigned 
clistricts. 
Whether at the same time it may not be advisable to arrange for 
the temporary retention of our garrison in a post of such strategic 
importance as the town of Candahar, after the civil government of the 
province kts been restored to the hands of Afghan officials, is a ques- 
tion that is well morthy of consideration, and to which I shall again 
refer when discussing our military frontier. As the treaty stands a t  
present, Candahar is definitively abandoned to the Afghans, and our 
troops are by amicable arrangement to evacuate the district as soon 
as the weather admits of the movement, retiring across the Khojak 
Pass upon Pishin, which we are to hold upon the same terms as Kuram 
and Sibi. Now, Pishin is in many respects well suited for the site of 
a frontier cantonment. The valley is compact and of moderate extent, 
well watered and cultivated, and inhabited for the most part by 
industrious Tor-Tirins and Syuds, who are employed either in agri- 
culture or trade, and are likely t o  prove obedient and orderly subjects, 
while their immediate neighbours, the Atchikzyes of the Khoja-Amr5n 
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r a n g e ,  and the Western Kakers, are among the least turbulent of the 
A f g h a n  tribesmen. And although a t  first sight it might seem 
P r o b a b l e  that friction would arise from the strange medley of juris- 
d i c t i o n s  which  rill prevail under the new treaty arrangement in the 
d i s t r i c t s  betaeen Candahar and Cutchee, that objection need not much 
d i s t u r b  us. North of the Khojak Pass, for instance, the Cabul Amir 
will be supreme ; while to the south of the range, in the assigned 
d i s t r i c t  of Pishin, English lam will prevail. Quetta again, the Bolan 
P a s s ,  and adjoining districts, mill belong to Kelat, with the exception 
of Sibi, which is temporarily assigned to us by the Treaty of Ganda- 
m a k  ; while the Afghan Kakers, through whose country will lie the 
o n l y  lines of direct communication between Pishin and the Indus 
va l ley ,  are virtually independent of Cabul, and the Belooch tribes of 
IkTurrie and Boogtie, further south, between the Kaker country and 
S i n d e ,  are virtually independent of Kelat. But practically, no doubt, 
we shall do pretty mnch as we please throughout the entire region, 
a n d ,  indeed, I can only look on the present nominal reservation of 
r i g h t s  as the transition stage betmeen independence and annexation. 
The military aspect of the frontier rectification must be considered 
separately. It i s  desirable in the first place to formalise the orogra- 
ph ica l  statistics of the frontier-that is, to show the several routes by 
which  armies at  different periods of history have crossed the moun- 
t a i n s  leading from the Afghan plateau upon India. Alexander tra- 
versed the Yussofzye country, north of the CabuI river, along a line 
almost  impracticable to a modern army ; while throughout the 
Buddhistic period which succeeded the Greek, if we may judge by 
t h e  monuments which line the entire route from Cabul to the Indus, 
t h e  Indo-Scythian invaders must have always followed the present 
4 h i g h  road by Jellalabad and the Khyber to Peshawer. When Ghazni 
became the capital, the ordinary route led by Gardiz and F u r m a  t o  
Bunnoo, a t  the foot of the mountains, this being the line described 
b y  Bircni, vho was a t  Mahmud's Court, as vell as by the contem- 
porary geographer Mokadassi ; but during the rude of the later 
Ghaznevides, as well as under the Ghoride kings, who founded the 
c i ty  of Kermhn on the southern slopes of the Sufid-koh, the Kuram 
valley seems to have become the high road of commerce and mar, ' though the Khyber Pass-that is, the line from. Farshabfir to 
Xagrahar (Peshamer to Jellahbad)-was sometimes followed. Chen- 
ghiz Khan and Tirnur both elected in their invasions of Illdia the 
a Hariy&b and Kuram route, while Baber, who himself came down the 
Khyber, gives the preference, after full inquiry, to the route through 
t h e  FurmGl valley, as the shortest and easiest passage of the moun- 
1 tains. Of the remaining passes further south I may add that there 
i s  no instance, as far as I know, of an army having ever passed by the 
Gomal or Ghmalari route, though, as the shortest in distance, it is the 
4 favourite caravan line at  the present day from Candahar to the Indus 
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valley. The usual route from Candahar or the vicinity to the south- 
east has always been by the Tall-ChotiBli valley, recently explored 
and mapped by General Biddulph, Baber having passed through this 
region-which is tolerably open after the Sulimhn range has been once 
turned-to Ghazni, and Prince D&rB Shekoh to Candahar. Nadir 
-Shah alone of all the historical invaders of India seems to have 
traversed the Bolan Pass. 
No doubt these historical traditions had their due weight i n  
determining the Viceroy to limit his frontier rectification to t h ree  
principal points. His first consideration would be that by holding 
and fortifying the Khyber and Michni passes, all approach t o  
Peshawer from the west and north would be effectually barred, while 
a t  the same time Jellalabad would be placed, as it were, permanently 
under fire. It would be evident in  the next place that the occupa- 
tion of Kuram, supported by a strong post a t  Thal, and t o  be connected 
in due course with the Punjab Railway system, would be a most impor- 
tant military arrangement, commanding as it would the three lines 
by FnrmGl, by Khost, and by the Piwar Pass; while, a t  the same 
time, the control exercised by us over the Shutar-gardan Pass from 
our extreme frontier post a t  Ali Kheil would virtually place the town of 
Cabul a t  our disposal, thedistance from the pass to the Capital being 
only about sixty miles through the open and well-watered valley of 
Logur. The third point, Pishin, selected by the Viceroy for rectifi- 
cation, has the same strategic importance for Western Afghanistan 
that Kuram possesses for the eastern division of the country, inas- 
much as all the various routes from the Indus to Candahar by t h e  
Zhob, the Bori and the Tall-Chotitili valleys, as well as the high road 
by the Bolan and Quetta, concentrate in  the plain of Pishin, from 
whence they are severally continued to the north by one or other of 
the various easy passes which intersect the Khoja-Amr&n range. Our 
best strategicel authorities, headed by Lord Napier of Magdala and 
General Hamley, are of opinion that, in view of the probable require- 
ments of the situation a t  no distant period, Candahar itself is a far 
stronger and a far more desirable military position than Pishin, not- 
withstanding the increased difficulty which its occupation would 
involve of communicating with India, and notwithstanding the  
unsymmetrical conto~u which would be given to the frontier by so 
abrupt and extensive a projection of British territory to the north- 
ward ; and I confess that as a military man I am strongly inclined t o  
adopt their reasoning. Looking, indeed, to the certainty that  i f  
military danger does approach India, it must cgme, not from t h e  
north, but from the north-west, as the line of least resistance, and 
foreseeing the necessity, under such circumstances, of keeping a 
vigilant wateh upon Herat, where the great interest of the situation 
will be focussed, I feel the utmost reluctance to give up our hold on 
Candahar, fio admirably fitted as it is both for observation and for 
support 
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support ,  Now, I have never coveted nor recommended the annexa- 
t i o n  of ViTestern Afghanistan. On the  contrary, 1 have freqnently 
Pointed out that to 11ndert:~ke the responsibilities of the ciril govern- 
m e n t  of the province wo~~lcl be a source to us of weakness rather than 
of strength, and I have now brought forward the additional argument 
t h a t  t o  amputate a limb of this magnitude from the Afghan State a t  
t h e  present juncture would be to wreck the monarchy ; but a mere 
temporary military occupation, guarded from all semblance of adminis- 
t r a t i ve  interference, and undertaken with the full approval.of the Cabul 
Government,, does not seem to me to be open to the same objection, but, 
on the contrary, to be nothing more than a legitimate-almost a 
necessary-precaution of defence, when a serious Russian expedition 
is advancing from the Caspian with the scarcely disguised object of 
threatening the frontier of Herat. So strong, indeed, is my convic- 
t i o n  of the soundness of this view, so self-evident does it apFear to 
m e  that as the Russian cloud spreads to the  eastward, and begins to 
darken over Merv, the Afghans must needs put all jealousy on one 
s i d e  and i n  the instinct of self-preservation apply to us for aid to 
m e e t  the storm, that I. should almost doubt if the order for retiring in 
September from Candahar would really be carried out ; or if, in order 
t o  fulfil the letter of the treaty engagement, the British troops were to 
cross the Khojak Pass at  the appointed time, I should look with con- 
fidence to their return a t  no distant date on Yacilb Khan's own requi- 
sition, and with the view of furnishing an auxiliary column for the 
defence of the western frontier of Afghanistan. I shall glance again 
at this question of the surrender of Candahar when I come to consider 
t 2he  progress and probable results of the Russian advance. 
The remaining articles of the treaty do not require any very 
special consideration. The amnesty clause supplies a want that was 
deeply felt when we evacuated the Afghan country in 1842. On that 
occasion the native Minister, who had supplied the Candahar army 
during the whole period of trouble, but  for whose safety, in spite of 
all my efforts to the contrary, no precautions were taken, said t o  me 
w i t h  bitter emphasis as the last troops marched out of the town, 
You have saved yonr o m  army, bu t  you have sacrificed us;' and, 
in  point of fact, on the return of the Barnckzye Sirdars, the Minister 
a n d  hi.; family, who were the heads of the ParsiwBn community of 
Candahar, were destroyed root and branch, to our deep humiliation 
and, I will even say, disgrace. I t  is happy for our national reputa- 
tion, and for the consciences of our ofiicers, that a more humane 
a n d  considerate policy now prevails. 
On the question of maintaining British officers in the country, 
rnhich became a rallying cry in the late party contests on the Afghan 
mar, i t  is remarkable that Yactib Khan took a diametrically opposite 
viem to that which his father maintained, or at any rate professed to 
maintain. Shir Ali mould have admitted British agenta in the 
provinces, but interdicted their residence a t  Cabul, on the score of 
personal danger. Yaciib Khan, on the contrary, argued, with a far 
greater show of reason, that a t  Cabul, where his rule was supreme, he 
could guarantee the protection of his guests, whereas a t  a distance 
there might always be a risk of outrage. Practically, British officers 
mill, I believe, under the new arrangements, associate with the 
Afghan chiefs very much as Russian officers associate with the Begs 
of the outlying districts of Xokand and Bokhara, regarded no doubt 
occasionally as troublesome interlopers, but not exposed to any special 
danger. British political officers, indeed, in responsible positions and 
brought into close intercourse with native races, are as a rule soon 
encircled with a halo of personal affection, ~ h i c h ,  as far as they are 
individl-ially concerned, is a better safeguard than sabres and bayonets, 
and which, moreover, largely adds to the influence and dignity of the 
Government. 
The 6th and '7th Articles of the Treaty of Gandamak, providing 
for the security and extension of our trade with Afghanistan and the 
countries beyond, do not seem to have as yet attracted much attention 
either i n  England or in India ; but in Russia a cry has already gone 
up under the soreness of disappointed monopoly which exaggerates the 
importance of our success, and even places our commercial above our 
political triumph. The St. Petersburg Gazette (No. 140, of June 5, 
1879) thus laments over the situation :- 
There is now nothing to prevent the English from carrying out their long 
cherished commercial designs in Central Asia, and in the markets of the western 
confines of China. It may be presumed that these designs will f i s t  exhibit them- 
selves in the form of a railway, northward from Peshawer. But the English will a t  
the same time endeavour to carry another of their contemplated designs into =ecu- 
tion. They will try to cut us off from the markets of Western China. For this 
purpose they will seek first to establish their commercial and then their political 
influence in Kashgaria. This they attempted to do when Kashgar was governed 
by YacGb Beg. . . . If our merchandise is ousted from the markets of Kashgaria, 
our commerce will suffer in Bokhara and throughout all Turkestrin, and we must 
never forget that trade in Uentral Asia is the great lever of political influence. 
Now, this note of alarm, though premature, is significant, and 
points to the direction in which, in the true interests of commerce, 
me should now labour. Whatever may be the import and export 
duties agreed upon for our direct trade with Afghanistan, care should 
at any rate be taken in the Commercial. Treaty about t o  be negotiated 
for the adoption of the lowest possible scale of transit dues, so that, in 
fair and reasonable competition with Russia, we may throw our 
Indian produce and home manufactures into Kashgaria through 
Chitrsl or Badakhshgn, and may receive Chinese commodities in 
return. The commercial ventures opened with Western China 
through Thibet and Cashmir have hitherto proved a financial failure, 
bnt if the Afghan and Dard tribes are fsiendly there seems to be no 
reason whatever why a really profitable trade should not be pushed 
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rice at Cabu17 On the 
~f along the open Chitr&l valley and over the Biroghil Pass to Yarkend " 
argued, with a far a d  Kashgsr, where we certainly ought to be able to compete success- kvliere his rule lvas mpreme 
e fully with the Russian caravans creeping laboriously from the T-olga i at a through '&&end, or from the Caspian by Bokllara and Sarnar- 
Pmcticall~7 British ,ficeT8 
associate tl,e It mill be observed that no notice is taken in the treaty of our 
meen i'ssOgate with the Begs relations any of the independent tribes excepting those con- ' "lihara7 regarded 
no doubt nea with t& Khyber Pass, notwithstanding that our position at 
' "'it 'lot exposed 
special three points above the passes must necessarily brhg us in contact 
'"I' responbible 
positionsand I with a large mountaineer population, comprising some of the 
raCeSy are a rule 8or. wildest and most m l i l y  clans in the country, sceh as t,he Southern 
ia'i' u'lichJ as far as they are 
~ f ~ < s ~  and Urakzyes, the Jfijis and %langals, the 3 i i r s ~ d  Yaairis 
'""'"' tbilns3~resandba~~neta, and especially the Tjrins and Kakers. It Tas probably thought C? ili'ilence and dignity ofthe 1 to have our hands as free as possible in dealing with SO 
i difficult a question, where the sympathy of the Cabul Court could be 
of G a n d ~ k ,  p ~ ~ ~ i d i ~ ~  
xttle use to us, where engagements, indeed, on either side 
"" Afghanistan and the be not only inoperative but misleading. It is not for a 
'" yct attracted much attention moment o be imagined, as some sanguine cartographers have 4 
a Cry has already gone essayed to prove, that ihe new frontier is to be aligned on the 
"'""~~b ~ ~ l l i c h  exaggeratesthe salient points of the districts. The real red line will 
"'+ commercial above ollr probably only be advanced about twenty-four miles up the Khyber 
Q r r s e ~ ~ ~  (yo. 140, of June 5, pass from Jamrfid to Lundi-Khans; and even in the assigned 
- 
I districts the limits on all sides will be retrenched as far as is 
Esfl  from carrying out their lolls consistent ~ t , h  military exigencies ; but still, with every disposi- 
.*ld in bl~e  markets ofthe wesi87n tion to err on the side of moderation rather than of excess, it is 
designs vill first exhibit them. , certain that under the Gmdamak arrangement our relations with the 
' w ~ ~ ~ ~ -  But the English d l  st independent ~ f g h a n  tribes must be largely developed ; and herein 
ir eoliem~lateddedgnsinto execu- lies the danger, or rather the inconvenience, of the new situation- 
'i*'tr '' China. this F~~ instance, the Shinvaris, the TT&is, the Uralcjrzes and the 3bngals JmI*rcid and then their political 
12  do gashgar ma goremed \ be curbed, and the Jfahsud Vazirih who have never yet been 
'a f i ~ m  the rnnrkeh of Kn8hoOaIia, punished f o ~  their raid upon Tank and other excesses committed 
f 1 ~ 0 ~ t  d l  T~rkestBn, and muat during the war, mush sooner or later receive a severe and salutary 
*td Isvcr (3f political influence. 1 , lesson,while on the hand a liberal blackmail must be b~s tored  
-iimntllre, is and { on the Afridfs and Mohmends of the K h ~ b e r ;  and if direct 'Om- 
true interests of commerce, munications, commercial or military, are to be kept between 
b,: tho import and export Pishin and the Indus valley, the Tirins and Kakers require 
i t  h Afghneistm, care be largely subsiclised Altogether I do not pretend to look On the 
rrcaaly *but to be negotiated new frontier arrangements as economical. On the I 
,iC? @f trtzn& dues, so that, in be if they do not entail an increase Of ; but any 
lztImi8, .rr,e may throw our such will be more than counterbalanced the a'- 
intu ~ ~ ~ h ~ ~ ~ i ~  through OW general position and giving 
$c IX~iaeso commodities in 
aned WesEtm China 1 1t remains to consider the amount of subsidy. an 
, a financial failure, 1 outcry was at one time raised again& paying a vanquished 
it 
to be no seems on fllrther consideration t o  be now generaUy admitted that the 
money is laid out, illat, in  fact, if the conditions of the bargain mile etlould not be pushed 
L 
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are duly observed, the tranqaction is a rely favourable one for Indict, instance two military posts-- 01 
sir lakhs of rupees a year being a very moderate insurance upon our buchnre of the Oxus, and t he  ot 
- Indian revenues against actire anuoynuce from the iiltrinues of Rut firmrds in inaugr 
sin. If mar, indeecl, Tere to Si1peY.r-ene in connection with the pen,j- up to that period there was ' 
inp Tureoman Expedition, rre should be prepared, no doubt, in our l " ~ c O m ~ ~ ~ '  t'vo nations ' 
own interests to raise the i4f..l!an subsidy to the amount allotted ta by any relations, political or con 
former ruler8 of Cahd, or even to increase i t  according to the eni- W S  thus no On to 
gencies of our ally's position. ,,,13posin that there mere such el 
The best practical mode of gauging the ~ a l u e  of a treaty, a mode hDy Christian ~ o ~ v e r -  Du 
more true ancl more sound thrzn nny criticism however searclling and 1873, some of the Turcornan t r  
honest, is bp observing the effect produced by it 011 neighbobouring i true, come into with 
States; and if we apply this test, in tlie present instance, the is a d  Tekehs~ vho have been 
in the highest degree satisfactory. Xot only, indeed, has the Russian hostility, held " 
ising influence of the Gandamak settlement been perceptible at all the two years later that quar 
native Courls of India-st Gwalior and Indore as well as a t  Hyderabad 3,ssumed any serious proportionc 
and Sepaul-but we are assured that a still more decided effect has Since 1875, however7 Russ 
been produced in Persia, where the unexpected triumph of our arms, the Akhds and Tekehs and th 
combined with our unexampled moder:~tion as victors, has createcl on the pretext that they interr~ 
quite a revulsion of feeling in  our favour ; and if any further proof tion betrveell Krasnovodsk and ' 
were needed of a belief in the completeness of our success, it might uearest point is 200 miles dii! 
be found not on!yin the language of the Russian press, which betrays settlements; sometimes she ha 
a painful sense of national humiliation, but also in the attitude which arms in order to protect t he  
the Russian Government has assumed in consequence of the Afghan n e i g l l b o ~ ~ ~  ; and sometimes, a 
war, and in the retaliatory efforts which it is now bent, on making the sympathy uf Eltrope in  the  
in order to recover its prestige. ' YOLW Afghan successes,' said a - claims that it is the mission of - 
high Rzssian functionary a t  the commencement of the present year, throughout the East. Le t  it 
' will compel US to take Nerv, whether we like i t  or not. We cannot severd pleas are a mere sham 
afford to be driven out of Cabul at the mere threat of an English the Tnrcomans are, in  fact, th(  
17iceroy. Our Empire is founded on prestige as much as yours, and i t  fhle,  aud that the real ground 
becomes therefore a matter of State necessity that we shoLzld redress a d;l'f'erent direction. such  ; 
the balance in Central Asia.' I n  this pregnant sentence-which, dwofold. I n  the first place, 
howeyer, is false and misleading in so far that i t  confounds cause olidation of Russian power i 
with effect, and imputes an aggressive character b what was strictly =pded lines of cornmrlnica 
a measure of defence-we have, I think, a true explanation of the xus, across the Steppes i d  
grounds of the great expedition which is now marching to the east- seconclly, it has d r a y s  been 
ward from the Caspian, an expedition which may lead to consequences sccept,ecl by her as a fixed pril 
of the first political magnitude, and to which accordingly, in con- advallce to the Afghan fron 
tinuation of a long series of mollitory addresses on the some subject, regard to Eno1and, and  the 
I n o r  propose to draw particular attention.2 European pol~tlcs. . '? * Bearing t 
The connection of Russia with the Turcomans is of recent date. ceecl to record her progress. 
It is only7 indeed, ten Years ago that Russian troops made their T - , ~  various tl: 
descent upon the east shore of the Caspian, establishing in the first the starting-points of Krasno 
= ~ n  addition to the series of esmps published in & , ~ ~ b , u i  O , L ~  ztuaia n $he E ~ ~ ,  1878 were mere reconnaisfls~n 
*k. 
1875, I wollld refer the reader to two recent papers: 1. ' ~ ~ ~ ~ i ~  and the Indian the temper of the tribes and ] 
Frontier,' in the &zlartol.ly h ' c v b ~ ~  for January 1879; and 2. The Road to Merv,' Vb.-ce. Last year, for the  fir$ 
rvo?ttt82y Rccord of RogaZ Gcogrnphical SorictZ/ fo r  March 1879. VOL. VI.-NO. 30. 
bq r, 
4 lRaction is a ITerY favoural~le one fa lo$ illst;iuee posts-one d l ~ ~ m o r o i i s k ,  R C L I ~  llle alll em- 
a 
moderate insurance opoa,' ' ilouchure of tile Oru;, and tile uther st fhikiaiiirr> furibui + o f i ~ ~ ~ - - ~ ~ ~ l  
tive annoyance from the intrigues 
f 
in dliz coarse in;lugr;r.lting Tmns-Caspian (ionmu~enr. 
to S"pervene in connection with fbCv , cp to illat period there v;as no enmity lieiscen I?u..-is i ~ d  the 
' @ sho"ld be prepared, no doid$> TmeumJus. The i-170 rntioui \;-ere not even nrighbinlouri. nui. h i n d  
Afgl'an to the amoUnt allotisi: iIY relntioDy, or eom~uemi;il, and the C~ar ' i  ~urclnnlr l i t  
to increase i t  according tathen., i\.ns thus more to resent the evil doiugs of the T{iei~r-- 1, 
, zilppo"n$ tlxit therei~ere suclz evil doiugs-than nas Gre:~t Britain of Of 
the value of a treatJ, mN, otlior ('hrisiim Poirer. During the earnpa@ ngaiinrl I<iiir.l 
L1'sn "'y criticism however rearchiugK 1gi-3, some the T u r e o ~ ~ n  trij>cs, sad nob~l ly  tile YeilriXa. did, it 
; Pr0duepd b , ~  it 011 neigbbou$b, is irlle, come into coifision \;itL the Ru;sim rolumrS, but tli!? -4kh:ildi 
test ln 'lie Present inltanee, the rsnll; and ~ ~ l ; ~ b ,  n.b hr-e  heen since jogled out 3s the specid u\deci. of 
r.Lctory' Not ~nlJ', indeed, bas the qtic!. !,Kubdn hostility, ]leu on t h a ~  ueca.i.in ; ant1 it sas not ~ 1 i i 1  
ri'"k been perceptiblevtln a ! tllzt the <parrci i ?tween Ro:?ia :ind t l i m  n h e -  
"liar and Indore as well as at HgdeTah,u : m). ierioiis prqortioni. 
a still more decided aflecib. ,, Since 1875, hoFveicr, l:usrki ilrs iaeu cuntiuuaily dexiouucin:: 
"e the unexpected triumph of our lm.s Lhe bkhals iiud Teicehr ancl threatening to ;~ttaeii t i m  : suu~t imei  
')led as victors, has ataid the p;c{ext that they intcyrupted tho I h ~ a i a u  line d c0wmiiuii.:~- 
in Our favour ; and if any furiherw tion betlipili Kraynomihl; and Cbiliisi~lar, $ihicl~ line; i iorr i  ci, :it t h  
lie c o m ~ l e b n e S ~  of our suCcess,ithgi; ' is 200 miled dirtant from the xilost ivcrtrriiiy -1kh;1; 
:'lage of the Russian press7 &ich bebri ; ha; ~,rufes.ed tu lie riLlig13ii b~ i;i:ld "1' 
'miliation, but dso in the attitudenbid arm, in to protect tiic l o ~ a l  Ternilts n$is>l tilcir triic~!r'u: 
"ssume~l in consequence of tbe~bhau ileigl,buisi ; ;mcl ;is in the plvieut ii:ki;dire. -1.t) iri!it~i 
I ifforts which it is nos bent on mlkog the sympli~y Europe in 1,~i;e~uiinc i i lu t i i~  of il-.r ;iti;;!zclb, .:nli 
'tige- 
' YOW Afghan successes,, said that i: is the m i ~ i o l l  of I:ua;i;i tu ~ilppn:s. tile t,utli!:g ill -',:J 3 
the commencement of the presentyar, j :l,roo&oot ih East. 1,et i! Ijt? ~ n ~ l e r ~ t o ~ ~ i  013ee :ill t ~ l ~ 1 ~  tlic?e 
w h e t h e r  we like i t  or not, We camd no!p-\-ed are mere ; ttl;it tile I :~~~s i : in  complainti n.:ain?r 
"bill at the  mere threat of an xngbib tlie ~ ~ l ~ c o m ; m a  in f&, those of tho 1;-oii ::gaiild tilt I~aiib in 
jed on prestige as much as youa,aniii f2hle, that tile grouncls of I~c-ibtility are to ~ jc i  euilgilt ill iluitrA 
State nece~sitp that r e  sbo~dla~re8s / &fierout direetioll. Such gru~liimds art? nut far t o  .celc. Tile?- arc 
' I n  this pregnant 8entenCeeWhiCh, nufold. In the first place, i t  is held to ix. neceSs3ry TO tlic cJn- 
ling in so far that it confounds cause 1 Dlidatio,l of Russiall paver in  'l'urkestan th:lt there shoulcl Illi- 
x g r r s s i v e  character to whatras atdctlJ 1 npecled lines of commiinientiou betreen tho Caspian the 
.e, I think, a true explanation be sus, ;hcross the Steppes inhabited lly the T ~ ~ ~ C O I ~ ~ P I  ! ~ ~ ~ ~ s :  anti: 
n which is now marching to the ah , secontjly2 it h s  ~ 1 ~ a - j ~  been patenL to Russia, and ha; a ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ s  'iweil 
edition wbich mag lead to  eonsequenco ( necepted her as a fired principle of policy7 thai the nearer silt 
k, and to which accordingly, in ma. nclvanee to the .lfghnn frontier the ~tr@nger ) ill her positin 
*kuuitory addresees on tha same I regard to England, and the higher tone she cciii nr-omr 
:&I attention.a gllrOpem politics. Bearing thiz eapk~nzkion in mia& I rill 1ltN- i-jro- 
with the Turcomans is of recent date, ceed to record her progress. 
ago tba t  Russian troops m d e  their ~h~ yRriolls e s p e ~ l ~ t , ~ o ~ s  that xere 1:iunched into the StePPe ffonl 
f t he  Caspian, at&lisbing in the I the siar!iag-point~ of Krasnovodsk Chikishbr betireen lST3 f 1878 mere secannaissancee, ~xmj.ertaIiea a i th  the ~f trying 
5 ~u'tdished in Ettyland and W~ssiain the East, 
,,, pape n: cBnapia \ the teemper of the tribes and p r e p a r k  the T Z Y  
,r Jnnuaw l8m ; 2. , T* aoad vrace. I,nst yeas, for the first time, something more '' 
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been intended t,han a mere demonstration. The column of 3,000 men 
amply provided with carriage and supplies, which left Cbikishlar id :"Y 1 1 ~  t k  inme 
July 1876 under General Lomakin, had been evidently organised with t r e k  :in,\ tltu Simlia~ 
a view of co-operating with the TnrkestBn forces then marching under north,yn El:,,, of the Kr! 
Icaufmann in persou against the Afghan frontier. Merv or Herat mas ' 5 0  zlliltx< fro111 t I j t b  C:i: 
probably the ultimate object of the expedition; and if the advance of ~ea io l l ;  oppositica~m is 
the main body across tile Oxus had been prosecuted, and Persian to fore~:lst i ip  progrti: 
opposition from the Khorassan border had been ne~ztralised-as i t  elated Ilour:~kitl's F 
%is t anlee %ncl t 11re:tCt probably would have been under the circumstances-there is no reason K i z i l - ~ ~ s Z t  ant.] Dert: 
why Lomakin shoulld not have fully accomplished his design. 
By M e p t  i ea l  of an?- sil~ll the month of August, however, when the Russian troops had reacher1 
chiefG of the Khornasb the Alihal border, 250 miles from the Caspian, and panic was begin- 
w i l l ,  in  all probabilit 
ning to spread among the tribes of the Steppe, the "Ian of a Central 
m a n y  prerious occaeii Asian campaign had collapsed in consequence of the signing of the 
nat . ions.  The faint-1 Treaty of Berlin, and it only remained for Lomakin to withdraw his b o l d e r  spirit,s will 
men from their advanced and unsupported position, an operation f o r t s  and camp3 to tln 
. nrliich he performed in a masterly manner, and with a loss, as i t  is 
w i t h  their brethren Z 
stnted on the best authority, of 'only two killed and four or five q u e s t i o n  of supplies fi 
wounded.) R u s s i a n  espedition 1 
This year's proceedings have been condi~cted on a scale of far 
e f f o r t s  have been evic greater magnitude and completeness. Several months have been P e r s i a n  aid. ProTisj 
occupied in preparation. Some of the best officers in the Russian 
o f  t h e  columns, and 
service have been appointed to comnlands, incl~zding Major-General 
a m o u n t  of grain nj Borch for the infantry and Prince Witgenstein for the cavalry, with O b a h s '  of the Akha Colonel Prozorkevitch in charge of the artillery and Co~znt Malama 2 00 miles along the 
as head of the staff, the supreme command being a t  the same time the main cluestion, placed in the hands of General Lazareff, a man of no family and not 
r e l a t e s  to the readir 
much educat,ion, but a thorongh soldier and, what is still rarer in the , the front,ier dir 
Russian army, a man of unimpeachable character. The infantry moment all qnestior 
force, composed mainly of the twenty-first division, .rrhich has been p o l i t i c a l  influence 
~vitlidra~vn for this purpose from the army of the Caucasus, is said to Persia, 
amount to 16,000 men ; the cavalry, consisting of two Cossack regi- 
ments, a regiment of regular dragoons (whose employment is supposed 
expaition. it ihoi 
estimated as the artillery strength, furnished with thirty-six field guns, 
- 
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mn of 3'000men9 bably be the same as that p~~rsued last year by Lomakin, along ilre 
eft Chikishlar in *trek and the Simbar to Kh-oja-Kalasi and Bend-i-Has~an on the 
'Iy Organised with northern face of the Kursn-D6gh snge ;  and as far asthis point-about 
- 
under 250 miles from the Caspian-vhere the Akhal settlements commence, 
Or 
no serious opposition is to be erpscted. Beyond, i t  is not easy at  present if the 
to forecast the progress of erents. The Akhals, nho are still much 
Lted9 and Persian elated at Lomakin's supposed failure of last year, talk of a resolute 
Leutralised-as it resistance and threaten to dispute every inch of ground between there is reason Kizil-Arvai and Deregez ; but those who know them best are very his 
I sceptical of any such heroic efforts. Unless openly supported by the 
'Oops had chiefs of the Kllorass&n border, ~ 6 t h  the sanction of Persia, the Akhals pan ic  mas begin- 
mill, in all probability, melt away before the Russian arms, as on so 
'lan of a j many previous occasions have the Uzbegs, Kirghiz, and other kindred 
he signing of the 
nations. The faint-hearted will come in ancl sue for terms ; the 
his bolder spirit. will fall back as the Russians advance, leaving their 
On' an 'peration forts and camps to the mercy of the vietor, and finally taking refuge 
a loss, as it is with their brethren the Tekehs of Merv. And now to consider the 
and Or five question of supplies from Persia, on which the succegs or failure of the 
Russian expedition has been supposed to mainly depend-immense 
'n of far efforts have been evidently made t o  render the force independent of 
been Persian aid. Provision caravans in large numbers will follow in rear 
rs in the Russian of the columns, and as the recent harvest has been prolific, a certain 
lg Major-Genera1 amount of grain will thus, no doubt, be found in the abandoned 
the with 
6 ()bahsY of the Akhals, which extend in an unbroken series for nearly 
nd Count h'alrm' 200 miles along the northern slopes of the Kuran-D8gh range ; but 
at same time the main question, or what is suppored to be the main question, 
no and not relates to the readiness or not of Persia to furnish further supplies 
rarer in the from the frontier districts of Khorass6~. Now, pntting aside for the 
31. The infant?. moment all question of the struggle between England and Russia for 
n7 w'T1'ich has 'lee' political influence at the Court of Teheran, it cannot be doubted that 
aucasus) is said to Persia, looking merely to her own interests, mud regard the intrusion 
two  Cossack regi- 
is supposed 
expedition. But it  &ould be remembered that the circumstances of the present 
'), and local levies , , very different from the campaign of 18'73. On that occasion the lmes of 
while 500 Inen are march from the respective bases of Kinderlinsk Bay, of Orenbnrg, and of Tashlrend, 
irty-Six field guns, conducted through friendly or at any rate neutral districts to the ~ o i n t  of attack- 
the liirgbiz of the Ust-Urt or Eara-kalpacks of the Kizil-kum being of no m~litary This large army9 aCcounGso that there vas no frittering away of strength by detaching troops en 
horses--intended ~.,,,te ; whereas on the present expedition the entire route for 450 miles, from the 
e first time in the Caspian to the neighbonrhood of Merv, lies tbrough an enemy's country, where pre- 
3 Caspian, and the cautions on a large and efficient scale will be necessary for the protection of convoys 
and the maintenance of communication with the base. It  is probable, indeed, that 
Ouki, left Chikish- more than one-half of General LazareE's large force will be thus employed on 
of rotlte mill pro- escort or patrol duty, or in garrisoning a llne of posts in re= of the advancing 
colmn-at Chat, a t  Kizil-Arvat, at Geuk-tepeh, and a t  Ashkabad-so that 6,000 or 
which it has been 6,000 fighting; men will be alone avadable for active operations to  the east of the 
~ h t  necessary for the Akhal settlements, a force that tvould be hardly strong enough t o  attack the Tekeh 
to General Lazareff's position at  Merv, and still less to undertake a siege of Berat. 
D D ~  
of the Russian arms along her north-eastern frontier with profouncl 
suspicion and dislike. Knowing, as the Persians do, the omnivorous 
capacity of tile great Northern Octopus, i t  cannot be agreeable to 
them to iind a monster sucker enveloping the frontier of Khorassan 
fiom Asterabad t o  Serakhs; besides, the Shah has claims, of long 
standing and fairly supported, on the allegiance both of the Akhals 
and of the Tekehs, and if the Russian expedition succeed, such claims 
are a t  once wiped out for ever. It is clear, then, that  whatever may 
be his alajesty's personal leaning to his Russian friends, he cannot 
possibly look on Lasareff's advance x-ith favour; but to adopt 
lneasures t o  thwart i t  would be a very serious affair indeed, and might 
provoke consequences vhich, vithont a direct pledge of support from 
Englalid, fie conld not in common prudence encounter. As far as the 
matter of supplies is concerned no great difficulty will probably occur. 
Russia coulcl hardly demand substantive aid from Persia in  an expedi- 
tion which not only threatens the Shah's territorial rights, but is 
undertaken almost mithout disguise in a spirit of hostility to Englancl. 
Active assistance from Persia in furnishing supplies may thus be left 
out of the account; but, on the other hancl, witltholcling supplies by 
coercive measures might fnrnish Russia, vith legitimate grouncl of 
complaint. To establish, indeed, a cordon along the frontier so as to 
prevent the inhabitaiits of Bujnoord, KGchkn, and Deregez from 
selling the produce of tlieir fields LO the Russian commissariat ofLicerb 
i n  their immediate neighbo~zrhood-even if practicable, which may 
be doubted-woulcl be a measure of a decidedly unfriendly character, 
and might provolre reprisals. On the supply cluestion, then, i t  may 
be assumed that for the present Persia will observe a strict neutrality. 
Brit there is beyond the supply question a question of right of terri- 
tory, which is of far more importance, and on vhich neutrality is im- 
possible. I f  the Russian columns pursue their march to the eastvard 
beyond the Akhal settlements, i n  the directiolt either of Nerv or 
Serakhs, they immediately enter on bow3 f i d e  Persian territory. 
Deregez, Abiverd, Chardeh, and Mehila, which the Russian officers com- 
placently speak of as their contemplated basis of operations against 
3lerv, are as much a part of Persia as is Asterabacl or Teheran ; and 
there is no possibility of passing to  the eastwarcl of the Akhal country 
except along this line, for the desert to thc north is a u-aterless waste. 
It may be presnmed that if General Lazareff is orclered to atbnck Jierv 
he will, on his military responsibility, establish himself at such points 
as are most convenient for his enterprise, mithout concerning himself 
with the question whether he is or is not encamped on I'crsian terri- 
tory ; but it is clear that such a violation of terr i to~y vould form :! 
legitimate casus belli  for Persia, and tllat, if she dicl llot resent thib 
illvasion of her rights, we might vcry properly regarcl 11cr- as n con- 
senting party to our injury and act accordingly. 
XTmtil 
" O l l l d  of 
measure 
se, 
events bc 
purs -~xe .  
Pu&ing 
the s1,z-c-e 
w o r l d  a s  
Press t~r  
xerat, t k  
Persia t l  
Support 
Khorass~ 
Herat is 
ment b e  
has ~ V C I  
c o m p l i c i  
blow at 
any sue1 
present 
A f ' a n s  
: if a strc 
the X e r  
not  les: 
than th 
st Cabu' 
< c a l c r l l a  
n force 
j ealorzs 
ancl p o ~  
that a c: 
- even 
pe~ls ah11 2~22 
she m? 
' 
r n a c h i n  
Turkey 
1 I I B u L g a r  
pu rpos i  
ennblec 
u n d e r s t  
c o r n p o s  
t o g e t h t  
astern frontier w i t h  profoLInd Until we are directly assured of Russia's hostile intentions; i t  
,,Persians do, t h e  omnivoron, mould of c o m e  be premature to suggest even such an extreme 
IS, it cannot b e  agreeable t, measure as a defensive alliance wit11 Persia, which mould have so 
ing the frontier of Khorassan many serious inconveniences; but i t  is quite on the cards that, as 
,he Shah has claims, of long events become developed, that may be the least hazardous course to 
llegiance both of t h e  Akhal, $wrsue. If Russia, as there is strong reason to believe, is now 
:pedition succeed, such claims pushing on to 3lerv or Scrakhs, not so much for the punishment of 
ear, then, t ha t  whatever m%y the slave-dealing- Tekehs-though that of course is blazoned to the 
is Russian friends, he cannot world as the righteous object in view-as for the purpose of exerting 
~ i t h  favour ; b x ~ t  t o  adopt < a pressure on Afghanistan, and n~ith the ultimate hope of occupying 
-ious affair indeed, and might Herat, then it might rery possibly be a sound policy t o  extend to 
Erect pleclge of support from Persia the provisions of the Asia Jfinor Protectorate, or even to 
ncc encounter. A s  far as the support her act i~ely in vindica~ing her rights upon the frontier of 
difficulty mill probably occur. Rhorassgn. It is the nniversal belief in  the Russian army that 
aid froin Persia in a n  expeG- Herat is the real object of the present expedition, Turcoman punish- 
h's territorial r ights ,  but is ment being a mere by-game, or a t  most a means to an end ; and i t  
:pirit of hostility to  England, has even been suggested that an attempt will be made to secure the 
~g supplies m a y  t h u s  be left complicity both of Persia and of Ayi~h Khan in thus dealing a heavy 
lid, withholding supplies by blow at  the integrity of Afghanistan. I do not myself anticipate 
wit11 legi t imate ground of any such extreme and unjustifiable measure, but 1 do see that in the , 
)n along the f ron t i e r  so as to present unsettled state of public feeling a t  Cabul, and before the 
E;cch&n, and Deregez from Afghans have had time to realise the benefits of the English alliance, 
iussiall commissariat officers if a strong Russian force he allowed to establish itself vithin hail of 
n if practicable, which may the Herat frontier, very serious troubles are likely to ensue, troubles 
:idedly unfriendly character; not less pernicions in their character or less serious in their effect 
pply question, then,  it may than those which threatened t o  arise from Stofitoff's establishment 
1 observe a s tr ict  neutrality, at  Cab~~l.  The u.izinzfts of Russia in undertaking the enormous expense 
a question of r i g h t  of ierri- (calculated ac above a million sterling) and the heavy risk of sending 
1 on which neutral i ty is im- a force of 20,000 men to the Oxus, is unmistakable. She is intensely 
their march to the eastward jealous of our Afghan triumph, and believes that her own prestige 
irection either of Blerv or and power are jeopardised by our success. She seems, indeed, to think 
n& $cZe Persian tel-ritory. that a campaign similar in character and Bclnt to the conquest of Ichiva. 
ich the  R~lssian officers corn- * -even though it be similarly barren of substantive results-is indis- 
basis of operations ag.aiast , pensable to retrieve her position as the mistress of the destinies of 
Asterabad or Teheran ; and Central Asia ; and, holding further that that position is incompatible 
itward of the Akhal couutry vith our supremacy in the countries adjoining her southern frontier, i e north is a waterless v{sste. she may feel herself bound to put in action against us that same 
ff is orderedto attack Ivlerri 1 machinery of intrigue and agitation which she directed against 
blish himself at s u c h  points 1 Tlu-key with so much success in  the recent instances of Xervia and 
without collcernillg himself 1 Bulgaria. Unfortunately, too, there are instr~~ments suited to her 
mcampedl on Persian terri- purpose available a t  every turn. A jealousy of race has already 1 of territory ~ w ~ u l d  form a enabled her to initiate revolt L V O ~  the upper Osus, and it is nom 
if she did not resent  this \ uuderstoocl that under her at~spices a confederacy of Tajik chiefs- 
pe+ regarc2 Iler RR a ~011- composed of Abdul Fyz Khan of Darwaz, Pnssuf Ali Shah of Shign:in, 
n g l ~ .  " together with Mir Babu Khan and the other recalcitmat nobles of 
- 
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B~:dskhshGn and Vakniin-has been orgnnised, which may, for a time 33 f h ,11~~~  1 ~ 5  
a t  any rate, very seriously cripple the Afghan power to the north of P~-".bu21~ Pesai: 
the Hindii-kush. Abdur-Rahman Khan, again, that storm-bird of ar-r12 ;sorneti 
Afghan diplomacy, is still held in reserve at ,tamarcand, ready t o b ~ i ; ~ x l  :, 
swoop on TurkesCGn whenever his Russian friends may give therirk I skin, tE 
signal ; and a new aspirant for pomer, Iskender Khan, who represents j k b  r t*h i r~ .  ; 
the Herat branch of the Baruckzye governing family- being the eldest 'QQ" 3<t&~k-i 
sur~iving son of the well-known Sultan Ahmed Khan-and who served gt it t;tc1 :L 2 
for somegears with distinction in the Rnssian army, has now appeared a,talarrBt~ :x 
upon the scene, having been placed by the Persian Government id P:%&-.-c:d to t 
ii military commnnd upon the frontier, where he may prove a trouble- /6P:xre que; 
some aeighbour to Taciib Khan and his oEcers. With the evidence 'C*-x-xrnecl are 
before us of these elements of mischief available for the disturbance (nlnt i3 is ;.till 
of the Afghan settlement, and with the knowledge that any snch eit Earr by 
disturbance must react upon our immediate frontier, we cannot to5 
closely watch the progress of Lazareff's columns to the eastward. 
It is true that the Russian Government has formally disavowed the 
intention of attempting the present conquest of Merv ; b l ~ t  thip 
disavowal goes a very little way in reassuring ns as to the harmless- .gh nc.rln:: t 
ness of the pending expedition. If Herat be the clestination of the ' ,%~--9  at i:: it 
t.roops, Merv is entirely off the line of march, and would only b~ 5x1 illfluen 
attacked in case of serious molestation from the Tekehs ; bnt in all !"l.-1:t~e dissi 
probability neither Herat nor Merv is immediately threatened. i ' ~ ~ ~ ~ 7 \ . a i l ~  
There are many indications to show that the point a t  mhich the - c * m l ~ i u c b d  
campaign of the present year will be brought to a close will be either I. merit, see 
Deregez or Abiverd, where the Akhal settlements terminate, and 1 f r o n t i e r  f 
before the Tekeh conntry is entered. This would be a very convenient ' *Pa@ 1~~~ 
centre from which to conduct negotiations with illerv upon one side, a 'f"llere is 
and with the Khoras~fin Government upon the other, while from the it settlemer 
same point communications might also be opened up with Khiva :nx=tc~*"tte 
across the desert, and a direct pressure might further be exerted or, it treat 
Herat and the tribes in the neighbourhood. ; slrpp"rt9. 
And under such circumstances-that i ~ ,  supposing a large Russia1 d9;r'lssi'i 
force to be encamped at Abiverd (which is naturally the most fertilt .sl'e 
district of the Attock,' though ruined a t  present and almost unin i! mnxodify 
habited, owing to the depreciations of the Tekehs), and supposing that OPP""~ 
this force, which r~-oul~l immediately threaten illerv, mere in uninter -yithcr at 
ropted communication on one side with its base upon the Caspian, ant '?nt'igue' 
on the other with the Russian settlements on the Oxus-what mould b.' .-l'carned . 
t h e  Turc the proper policy for the British Goverament to pursue? It may b - 
' . 2 n d  mo presumed that Russia could not have attained such a position withod . 
having encountered energetic protests both from England and Persit 
from England, because we have already placed on reccrd the stronge 
remonstrances against a Russian occupation of Merv, and, as far a: 
Indian interests are concerned, all the arguments against the conqtlf ,xt snch 4 
A - 
l 
which may, for a tirnelof Agerv by a foreign Poser apply in  a still stronger degree to A biverd ; 
In Power to the north of from Persia, for two reasons : first,beo~use the Shah hasal~vays asserted, 
'"in7 that storm-bird of:and sometimes realised, a territorial light to the Merv district-a Per- 
Lt Samarcand, ready to:sian army, indeed, having captowii tlia city and surrouoding country 
I friends mag give tbehin 1860, though subsequently cornpelleJ, thiough military miwonduct, 
I 
er Khan, who represents to retire ; and secondly, because Abivercl is an undisputed dependency 
kmily-being theeldest of Kelat-i-Nadir, and its invasion by Russia must be held to con- / Khan-and who served stitute a gross violation of taritory. But v o d d  such a violation be 
army, haS now appeared declared a casus belli by the Shah, and would Great Britain be pre- 
1 Persian Government in pared to  take up arms in support of her Persian ally? These are 
he  may prove a trouble-/ grave questions, which I do not venture to answer. The interests con- 
k ~ .  With the evidence cerned are no doubt of the largest character. Russia has already made, 
able for the disturbance and is still making, the most strenuous efforts to draw Persia to her side, 
lowledge that any either by fair means or foul. A venal Court has been for the most part 
I frontier, w cannot too secured in her interest ; her officers are gaining influence and authority 
hmns to the wit11 the regular h s i a n  army ; tile Shah's personal feelings have been 
formally disavowed powerfully wrought upon ; i t  is now probable that pressure, and a pres- 
1st of Merv ; but sure of the most urgent and persistent kind, will be applied. Unaided, 
I 11s as to the harmless- i t  seems to me that Persia must inevitably yield ; but if she does yield, 
I the destination of the ,mhat is i t  we have to expect ? An argument has been brought forwald 
rch, and would only b6 i n  influential quarters, that the Afghan settlement mnst be held to 
1 the Tekehs ; but in all 'have dissipated all danger ; that alarms at the advance of Russia are 
hmediately threatened, 'ow vain alarms ; that even if Merv mere taken, and Russia and Persia 
he point at which the ,ombined threatened the Afghan border, the British-Indian Govern- 
to a close r i l l  be either .men& secure in Yacilb Khan's fidelity, and in his mainhenance of the 
Iements terminate, and frontier fortresses, of Herat and 3fymeneli especially, might laugh at 
p ld  be a very convenient , the  machinations of its enemies and defy their efforts to annoy us. 
i th Merv upon one side, There is much of fallacy, I beliere, in this argument. The ~ f ~ l l a n  
he other, while from the ,,settlement is a very good settlement as far as i t  goes, but i t  is not im- 
' opened up with ava maculate-it is not complete. To yield to us its full measure of defence, 
'ht further be exerted ot ithe treaty must be supplemented by all legitimate precautions and 
supports. Persia must be detached from Russia codte que  coiite. 
1pposing a large ~~~~i~~ Russia herself must not be left in any uncertainty as to our intentions. 
aturally the most fertat ,She must be made to understand, while there is yet time for her to  
esent and almost unin "modify her aggressive preparations, that she will not be pel-mitted un- 
ehs), ancl that opposed to establish herself in strength upon the Afghan frontier, 
31erv, were in uninter -either at Merv, or a t  Serakhs, or even a t  ,4biverd, nor to recommence 
e the caspian, an, . .intrigues against the British power in India. She might, indeed, be 
le ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ h ~ t  wo.L,ld b warned that, if necessary, me were prepared in self-defence to support 
to pursue ? ~t may b ,the Turcomans-with whom she has no legitimate quarrel-tvith arms 
such a position withod .>nd money, or even to turn the tables on her by encolnaging the 
rn &-,@and and per& pfforts of the Uzbegs to recover their liberty. Above all, a t  the 
on reccrd the stronge ?resent time, .me must show ourselves strong upon the threatened 
of ~ J I ~ ~ ~ ,  as far tlr. ,contier, and equal to any emergency. It would be almost fatuity 
its against the conqllf * ~ t  such a moment to withdraw our garrison from Chndahar. YacGb 
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Khan must be made to see that it is as much for his interest a: 
our own to hold an efficient body of British troops in such a positiol , 
that, on the approach of danger, and without any semblance ox $ A  
suspicion of interference with Afghan rights, they might, wit11 
military alacrity, occupy Herat as an auxiliary garrison. 
I cannot doubt that me are fhlly able to hold our own in the East, & 
as well as in the West. All that is required is that me sho~dd assume 1' 
the firm attitude and the bold language of conscious st,rength and of 
conscious right. 4 4 
H. 6. EAWLIXPO~. $+ 
